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The aim of this thesis was to examine the effects of changes in the migration routes (CMRs) 
of shared (transboundary and straddling) fish stocks on the cooperative conservation and 
management efforts of States. The CMR phenomenon, while not completely novel, appears to 
be intensifying in recent years with climate change playing an important role. Examining it is 
important because CMRs represent changes in factual circumstances with considerable legal 
effects that are largely unexplored in the legal literature. 
 
The thesis examined how States must cooperate in a CMR situation and what are the 
consequences should they fail to do so. In doing this, the thesis used the Mackerel dispute as 
case study because it is a recent and comprehensive CMR dispute, fittingly exemplifying a 
wide range of the legal issues that CMRs can create. The analysis focused, first, on the 
application of the duty to cooperate in CMR cases and, second, on the consequences of 
unsuccessful cooperation.  
 
In the application discussion, three common threads of CMRs were discerned, involving 
changes in the (1) nature of the stock, (2) States involved in the fishery, or (3) zonal 
attachment of the stock. The impact of these changes was found to range from distorting 
legitimate fishing interests and equitable arrangements to changing the applicable law. 
Furthermore, two perspectives were identified, under which States must cooperatively address 
CMRs. Under the voluntarist perspective, States may ignore a CMR if they so agree. Under 
the conservationist perspective, however, such discretion was found to be lacking when the 
viability of a stock is threatened. In analysing the consequences of unsuccessful cooperation, 
the thesis focused on three issues – pre-CMR agreements, dispute settlement and self-help 
measures. It was found that CMRs can be a basis for the termination of international 
agreements and that, while existing dispute settlement mechanisms may provide some 
answers for CMR-related issues, the sweeping jurisdictional limitations for fisheries cases can 
provoke retaliation and counter-measures instead of further cooperation.  
 
These findings show that CMRs can have tremendous legal implications and, due to their 
specificities, need to be examined in detail and separately from other conservation and 
management issues. Furthermore, States and scholars alike must be very attentive to CMRs in 
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1. Background and aims of the discussion 
 
Fish is one of the fundamental natural resources that the human civilization has been utilising 
in one way or another for thousands of years and on which the mankind is dependent for its 
survival. It was only a few hundred years ago that Grotius viewed this resource as 
inexhaustible.
1
 Today such views are only reminiscences of the past.
2
 Fisheries disputes, 
sometimes even called “wars”, are breaking out as there is not as much fish in the sea to 
satisfy the desires of the fishing nations. Instances of such disputes, to name a few, are the 
Cod Wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom, the Turbot War between Canada and the 
European Union (EU), the Swordfish War between Chile and the EU and most recently the 
Mackerel War between inter alia the Faroe Islands and the EU.  
 
A few decades ago, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
3
 (UNCLOS) – the 
most comprehensive treaty in the area of the law of the sea (LOS) to date – was concluded 
and today it has one hundred sixty-seven parties.
4
 This comprehensive instrument also covers 
fisheries. In order to provide, or at least attempt at providing, a comprehensive regime for the 
fisheries in the world oceans the drafters had to face the reality that others have faced before 
them – the fish do not respect the manmade jurisdictional boundaries in the seas and the 
oceans around the world.
5
 The fish move and migrate, some more than others. These 
migratory movements posed problems for finding a way to regulate them to the liking of all 
parties involved. Eventually, a consensus was reached and a few provisions appeared in the 
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 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397. 
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UNCLOS with respect to fish stocks migrating across certain maritime zones, underpinned by 
the duty to cooperate. Accordingly, the drafters considered that the migration routes of the 
fish stocks, although crossing zones and boundaries, have shown to be stable enough as to 
allow to be subjected to legal regulation.  
 
The solution of cooperation was seen as a step in the right direction but it was left 
counterproductively vague in the UNCLOS and needed further elaboration. This further 
elaboration was eventually provided in a treaty, separate from (and yet closely related to) the 
UNCLOS – the Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA).
6
 The UNFSA currently enjoys a serious 
but still not as wide support as the UNCLOS, with only eighty-two parties.
7
 At the moment of 
its adoption, the UNFSA was praised by Ambassador Nandan for being “far-sighted, far-
reaching, bold and revolutionary”
8
 and it was undoubtedly so. The ‘disorder’ that Mother 
Nature created for the mankind with the migratory nature of the fish stocks was more or less 
‘ordered’ through the legislative endeavour of many States.  
 
Be that as it may, in today’s time of constant changes, a question comes up that is neither 
abstract nor futuristic: how are we to address the changes in the migration routes of shared 
fish stocks? Some of the non-legal literature has started considering this question,
9
 while the 
legal literature is slowly catching up.
10
 While this question may receive different answers 
from the different disciplines that will seek to answer it,
11
 it is important that these answers 
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are, nevertheless, provided. Only then, can a comprehensive and consistent strategy be 
devised for responding in an adequate manner – a crucial element for the future operation of 
the international fisheries regimes.  
 
Today, mankind is facing the consequences of the climate change and volatile environmental 
variations (irrespective of whether they are manmade or not) that are affecting the living 
conditions both on land and in the world ocean. Affecting the conditions in the world ocean 
has direct repercussions for the fisheries management and conservation efforts. These 
repercussions have been observed for some time now and are intensifying. A study prepared 
for the European Parliament in 2007 stated that: 
 
“As several relevant industrial key fish species (such as herring and 
probably other small pelagic species) respond highly to varying 
hydrographic conditions, future fish stock management should be 
continuous, but flexible and adjustable according to the responses 
of fish stocks to future environmental conditions. Especially highly 
migrative species that alter their migration routes due to a changing 




Not long after this study, the Mackerel dispute materialised from exactly the circumstances 
that the study warned about. The Faroe Islands – one of the parties to the dispute – argued that, 
due to the increased temperatures of the North Atlantic waters, the herring and mackerel 
changed their migration routes resulting in increased abundance in Faroese waters which in 
turn gave it the right to a bigger quota. The dispute went as far as the EU – the other party – 
adopting an import ban against the Faroe Islands, on the one hand, and the initiation of 
proceedings against the EU before the WTO tribunal and an UNCLOS Annex VII tribunal by 
the Faroe Islands, on the other hand. The import ban was an implementation of Regulation 
1026/2012,
13
 which was itself adopted in response to the Mackerel dispute. After one year of 
intensive negotiations, while the measures were in force and at the pains of heavy legal battles, 
the EU and the Faroe Islands reached an out-of-court agreement, ending the dispute in August 
2014.  
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Notwithstanding the agreement, the issues that were raised remain open and cannot be 
ignored because they are bound to resurface.
14
 From the legal perspective, there is a multitude 
of such issues. This thesis will focus on legal issues relating to the application of the duty to 
cooperate in situations of changes in migration routes (CMRs) of shared stocks. It will aim to 
answer, on the one hand, how States must cooperate in a CMR situation and, on the other 
hand, what are the consequences should they fail.  
 
With respect to discharging the duty to cooperate, the thesis will examine to what extent a 
CMR affects the rights and duties of States and whether or not States are obliged to address 
every CMR of shared stocks. In that regard it will be examined how the different factual 
modalities of the CMRs can create different legal consequences. A special attention will also 
be paid to the role of the duty to negotiate as the main gateway to cooperation. With respect to 
the instances of unsuccessful cooperation, the thesis will discuss, first, the question of the 
status of the pre-CMR agreements and to what extent they are also affected, including 
whether a CMR can cause the termination of such pre-existing agreement. Secondly, the 
discussion will examine to what extent the existing regime provides solutions for settling 
disputes arising out of the specifics of the CMRs. Finally, the focus will be on the issue of 
what tools (self-help measures) are available to States to unilaterally protect their interests in a 
CMR dispute.  
 
In discussing all of these issues the thesis will use the Mackerel dispute as a case study. The 
Mackerel dispute is a very useful lens through which the abovementioned issues are to be 
examined for two main reasons – its multifaceted nature and its overall significance. With 
respect to its multifaceted nature, the Mackerel dispute, as will be explained in further detail 
later in the thesis, involves two associated stocks and their CMRs, several States with 
different fishing interests, unsuccessful cooperation efforts, initiation of international dispute 
settlement proceedings, and the use of self-help measures. This multitude of aspects largely 
overlaps with the issues concerning the application of the duty to cooperate that will be 
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discussed. The practice of all States involved in the Mackerel dispute will, therefore, be 
greatly elucidating the discussion. A crucial part of this practice is the EU’s Regulation 
1026/2012. It is a forerunner instrument breaking new ground for measures aimed at ensuring 
sustainable fishing. It is meant to address cooperation failures and incentivise the relevant 
parties to cooperate by warning them of possible trade measures. Such an instrument can have 
an immense effect on the modus cooperandi of States and hence on the application of the duty 
to cooperate, which requires this thesis to pay special attention to it. 
 
With respect to its significance, the Mackerel dispute is the first CMR dispute that developed 
as far as to include trade measures and the initiation of international proceedings. The dispute 
also involves the EU – a major fishing entity and consumption market as well as the largest 
importer of seafood products. The practice of such a large stakeholder in the international 
fisheries must not be lightly ignored. These two aspects, together with the successes and 
failures of the Mackerel dispute will undoubtedly serve as a reference base to other States and 
interested parties when they have to deal with CMRs of shared stocks in the future. It is only 
wise to do the same in the literature. 
 
 
2. Scope, caveats and use of terms in the discussion 
 
At this juncture several clarifications need to be made with respect to the scope of this thesis 
and the usage of certain terms. First, the focus of this thesis will be on the current treaty 
framework regulating shared stocks, as formed by the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Although 
they are only two of the several main international instruments dealing with fisheries,
15
 they 
are the two instruments that form the international regime specifically for shared fish stocks. 
Furthermore, the thesis will leave out the situations where some States are parties to the one 
agreement but not to the other. Although the UNFSA is not as widely ratified as the UNCLOS, 
many of the important fishing nations/entities, including the EU, have ratified it and as such 
focusing the discussion on both instruments, together, will be highly relevant. Both treaties 
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will be analysed together and will be referred to as ‘the existing regime’, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
The two instruments are also linked – both substantively and legally – and this must be kept in 
mind when considering the analysis of this thesis. The UNFSA’s main objective is “to ensure 
the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the [UNCLOS]”.
16
 
According to its Article 4, the UNFSA shall not “prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties 
of States under the [UNCLOS]. [The UNFSA] shall be interpreted and applied in the context 
of and in a manner consistent with the [UNCLOS]”.
17
 While the UNFSA is meant to 
implement certain UNCLOS provisions, it is still a separate international agreement with its 
own (and not overlapping with the UNCLOS) States parties. As such the UNFSA provisions 
are not applicable to States that did not ratify it, in accordance with the pacta tertiis rule.
18
 





Focusing exclusively on the UNCLOS and the UNFSA, however, would be counterproductive 
because the existing regime is a framework one and in need of being effectuated by a 
multitude of various other agreements.
 20
 In particular, regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMO) and the various direct arrangements between the relevant States 
represent focal points for the implementation of the existing regime.
21
 Together with the 
UNCLOS and the UNFSA, the RFMOs and the arrangements comprise “a three-tiered 
structure […] with mutual reinforcement and dependence”,
22
 which can be seen throughout 
the thesis.  
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Second, by CMR it is meant the change in the zonal attachment of the shared stocks. The 
zonal attachment refers, more generally, to the geographical distribution of the stocks and is a 
prominent principle in the process of division of shared stocks.
23
 The two main yardsticks for 
determining the zonal attachment are (1) the amount of stock present in the particular waters 
and (2) the time the stock spends in the particular zone during its migration.
24
 Simple as it 
looks at first sight, however, the zonal attachment of a stock can be measured differently and 
can be controversial.
25
 These variations have to do with the factual specificities of the stocks 
throughout their migration – that is – where the spawning areas are; what the distribution of 
egg and larvae is; what the occurrence of juvenile fish is; and what the occurrence and 
migrations of the fishable part of the stock are.
26
 A main premise of this thesis in this regard is 
that the CMR is a given fact and the focus will be on how the law addresses such a factual 
situation. Thus, the thesis will not deal with issues of proof and evidence of CMRs as these 
are, although relevant, separate issues. 
 
Third, as indicated in the title, the discussion in this thesis will focus on shared fish stocks. 
This notion needs a short explanation as it is used neither by the UNCLOS nor by the UNFSA 
but has emerged as shorthand for certain types of stocks in the literature and in the practice. 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), in its recent Advisory Opinion 
submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) (the Opinion) also identified 
the need to clarify this term.
27
 The ITLOS started with the definition of shared stocks that is 
provided in the regional treaty at hand in the Opinion. This definition states that shared stocks 
are “stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states or 
both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it”.
28
 Another 
notion that the ITLOS had to deal with (also used in Regulation 1026/2012) is ‘stocks of 
common interest’. The SRFC provided an explanation of this notion, which, as the ITLOS 
                                                 
23
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noted, overlaps with the notion shared stocks.
29
 Both of these notions were found by the 
ITLOS to refer to the stocks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 63 UNCLOS.  
Mindful of the fact that these notions are not yet of universal and uniform usage, this thesis 
will adopt the meaning that the ITLOS ascribed to them in its Opinion, as this author finds it 
to be generally encapsulating the notion fittingly. With respect to the stocks referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 63 UNCLOS, it must be stated that these are also referred to in 
shorthand as transboundary and straddling stocks, respectively. Transboundary stocks are the 
ones occurring only in (migrating only through) the EEZs of two or more States without 
reaching the high seas.
30
 Straddling stocks, on the other hand, are stocks that, next to the 
EEZs, are also present in and migrate onto the high seas.
31
 Additionally, since the thesis will 
focus on the shared stocks only, it will not discuss the specifics of highly migratory, 
anadromous or catadromous stocks, although certain parts of the analysis may be applicable 
mutatis mutandis to them as well.  
 
Fourth, the thesis will also have a more specific spatial focus. The issue of CMRs of shared 
stocks is predominantly, if not almost completely, relevant for only two particular maritime 
zones – the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the high seas. Consequently, the thesis will 
not look at the specifics and the peculiarities in other maritime zones such as internal waters, 




3. Structure of the discussion 
 
Section II will focus on the case study of the thesis – the Mackerel dispute – and Regulation 
1026/2012. The section will start by briefly introducing the role of the EU in fisheries 
conservation matters. The discussion will then look at how the Mackerel dispute developed 
and how it led to the adoption of Regulation 1026/2012. It will then take a quick look at the 
substance of the Regulation and its importance. The section will conclude with a recollection 
of the first implementation of the Regulation against the Faroe Islands.  
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Section III will aim to provide a thorough analysis of the duty to cooperate in the area of 
fisheries and its application. The discussion will start by examining the main characteristics of 
the duty to cooperate. Then, the bulk on the section will deal with the impact that CMRs have 
on the duty to cooperate, particularly on its application. This impact will be examined from 
two perspectives – the voluntarist and the conservationist ones. Each of them will be tailored 
to certain factual circumstances that may arise in a CMR situation.  
 
Section IV will aim to explore the consequences of unsuccessful cooperation. In particular, it 
will deal with three issues that this author finds most pressing in the case of a CMR. They are 
(1) the status of pre-existing (pre-CMR) agreements, (2) available dispute settlement 
mechanisms, and (3) self-help measures. Where the existing regime fails to provide the 
necessary guidance with respect to these issues, the discussion will go beyond the existing 
regime and apply general international law. The conclusions of the thesis will consequently be 
presented in section V.  
  















1. The EU and fisheries conservation and 
management 
 
The EU’s involvement in fisheries on the international plane represents an important part of 
the external action of the Union in general and it has been so for quite some time.
32
 Ever since 
the developments on the international plane in the 1970s relating to the establishment of the 
EEZ, the EU has been getting increasingly involved in almost all aspects of international 
fisheries. This progressive action went hand-in-hand with the development of EU’s 
competences, internally as well as externally. Internally, it was in the 1960s that the EU first 
started drawing upon its agricultural competence to develop what later became with the 
Maastricht Treaty a separate fisheries policy.
33
 With the increasing international consensus on 
the establishment of the EEZ as a new pivotal element of the LOS, the EU’s internal 
competences were of little use without the corresponding external competence. The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) categorically agreed and in 1976 ruled in the Kramer case that the EU 





The assumption of the external competence in the fisheries and other LOS matters put the EU 
firmly on the map by securing it a separate seat (and not just an observer status) at the 
negotiating table of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
35
 This 
separate seat was also along the seats of the Member States, making the resulting Convention 
a mixed agreement for the EU and a mystery in terms of competence, representation and 
responsibility for the other negotiating parties. In an attempt to answer these concerns the EU 
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was obliged to issue a declaration of competence, which in hindsight has proven to be of 
limited usefulness. Seemingly settled for the time being, the issue of the scope of EU’s 
exclusive external competence in the area of fisheries was re-opened again in the 1990s with 
respect to EU’s participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Compliance 
Agreement, the UNFSA and the UNCLOS.
36
 The issue was settled again with the result that 
both the UNCLOS and the UNFSA became mixed agreements for the EU with corresponding 
declarations of competence. Be that as it may, the aspects concerning fisheries conservation in 
these agreements remained an exclusive competence and this is now explicitly stated in 
Article 3(1)(d) TFEU. 
 
The exclusive authority that the EU developed in the area of fisheries, both internally and 
externally, has led to it being rightfully considered a “Single Coastal State” for the purposes 
of fisheries, notwithstanding the initial refusal by Eastern European States (the Soviet Union 
and fellow members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) to recognise the EU as a 
negotiating partner.
37
 Accordingly, the references to ‘States’ in this thesis are to be read to 
include the EU. Notwithstanding this image of unity and singularity, the EU is still composed 
of Member States with diverging fishing interests that are interacting at the EU level. In that 
sense, the EU’s execution of its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) can also be seen as a highly 
developed cooperative effort. This cooperative effort is underpinned by inter alia the 




This principle has very wide implications for the way the EU institutions as well as the 
Member States act, including in the area of the LOS. One of the expressions of this principle – 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ under Article 344 TFEU – was decisive in the MOX 
Plant dispute between Ireland and the UK.
 39
 In the infringement proceedings initiated by the 
Commission, the ECJ found Ireland to have breached its obligations of loyalty and of respect 
for ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction by instituting proceedings before a tribunal outside of the 
framework of the EU concerning issues of exclusive EU competence. Similar loyalty 
concerns arose in the Mackerel dispute. This was due to the special status of Denmark as an 
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EU Member State having the Faroe Islands as a self-governing territory within its borders but 
outside of the EU ones. Because Denmark is still in charge of certain aspects of the Faroe 
Islands’ external relations, including the participation in international court proceedings, 
formally, it was Denmark that initiated proceedings against the EU – a very rare occurrence 
that would normally violate Article 344 TFEU.
40
 However, in this particular case Denmark 
complied with its loyalty obligations. This was because EU law contains an exception for 
Member States having territories outside of the EU that need to have their interests protected 




In the context of the abovementioned exclusive competence developments, the CFP has been 
evolving and has gone through several reforms. With the last CFP reform, in 2011 the 
Commission introduced a new set of policy orientations for the external dimension of the 
CFP.
42
 These orientations were intended inter alia to “contribute to more responsible 
international fisheries governance”.
43
 The Commission also noted that the EU was 
cooperating with its Northern neighbours with respect to shared stocks, including mackerel, 
and that it will consider “best approaches to strengthen this cooperation to take into account 
developments in regional processes”.
44
 With these policy goals and competences in the 
background, the EU got involved in the Mackerel dispute and adopted Regulation 1026/2012. 
 




2.1 Overview of the two fisheries 
 
The Mackerel dispute, more generally, was a fishing-quota dispute concerning both Atlanto-
Scandian herring (Clupea harengus) (hereinafter referred to as herring) and North-East 
Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus) (hereinafter referred to as mackerel). The involvement 
of the two fish stocks needs to be elaborated upon here as they comprise a crucial part of the 
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factual background. Furthermore, both fisheries have a long history and for reasons of clarity 
a short overview of their recent history and regulatory regime needs to be provided as well.  
 
The Mackerel dispute concerned both herring and mackerel due to the changes in their zonal 
attachments, which coincided temporally and geographically to a large extent. Additionally, 
the two stocks are also associated species and are sometimes caught together, as in Faroese 
waters.
45
 Associated species, as a term, is mentioned several times in both the UNCLOS and 
the UNFSA but without providing a definition. Regulation 1026/2012 gives some insight in 
that regard. According to it, associated species means  
 
“any fish that belongs to the same ecosystem as the stock of common 
interest and that preys upon that stock, is preyed on by it, competes 
with it for food and living space or co-occurs with it in the same 





Both the herring and the mackerel are straddling stocks and as such they also appear beyond 
the EEZs of the relevant States – in the high seas. Accordingly, due to their high seas presence 
in the Regulatory and Convention Area set up by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries (NEAF) 
Convention,
47
, both stocks fall under the competence of the NEAF Commission (NEAFC). 
The contracting parties to the NEAF Convention are Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands 
and Greenland, the EU, Iceland, Norway and the Russia. The NEAFC can inter alia make 
recommendations concerning fisheries conducted (1) within the jurisdiction of contracting 
party (if it so requests) and (2) beyond the areas under the jurisdiction of the contracting 
parties but within the Convention Area.
48
 These recommendations can become binding unless 




The Clupea harengus is deemed the largest herring stock in the world and is “widely 
distributed and highly migratory throughout large parts of the [North-East] Atlantic during its 
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 The stock of the herring collapsed several decades ago due to overfishing and all 
fishing was ceased between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s. Once the stock was recovered 
and the fishing re-opened in 1996, it was managed by the EU, Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway 
and the Russia (the herring Coastal States) as it visited their EEZs during its migration.
51
 In 
1996 a long-term management plan was agreed upon lasting until 2002.
52
 From 2003 to 2006 
no agreement was reached and the quotas were set unilaterally.
53
 From 2007 to 2012 the 
herring Coastal States had an agreement on a management plan. However, with the outbreak 
of the Mackerel dispute in 2013 the Faroe Islands and the other herring Coastal States have 
been failing to agree on common Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and quota allocations. The 
agreement reached in 2013 and 2014 excluded the Faroe Islands, which adopted unilateral 
quotas.
54
 In 2013 and 2014 the Faroe Islands also objected to the NEAFC recommendations 
and was, therefore, not bound by them. In 2015 an agreement was reached on the TAC but not 




Since the early 1960s the migration route of the herring changed several times.
56
 When the 
stock collapsed the juvenile and the adult fish remained only in Norwegian waters.
57
 During 
the years of rebuilding of the stock, the herring slowly returned to its previous routes beyond 
Norwegian waters.
58
 This CMR, however, have been argued to be caused not only by changes 
in the parent stock biomass but also by changes in the environment.
59
 The International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) – a major intergovernmental organization 
delivering inter alia scientific management advice for the area of the North Atlantic – has 
recently also observed a change in the zonal attachment of the herring. In its reports for the 
past few years the ICES indicate increased presence of herring in Faroese and Icelandic 
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The Scomber scombrus is a stock present on both the West and the East sides of the North 
Atlantic.
62
 For the present discussion only the North-East Atlantic mackerel is of relevance.
63
 
In the North-East Atlantic the stock of the mackerel has been divided in three spawning 
components – Southern, Western and North Sea.
64
 The stock in the North Sea component 
collapsed in the 1970s.
65
 Even after extensive regulation aimed at protecting the stock in the 
North Sea it has not return to its pre-collapse levels and the reasons for this are unknown.
66
 
For many years the main part of the mackerel fishing was done by the EU and Norway. Since 
1999 the management agreements for mackerel included the Faroe Islands.
67
 However, from 
2009 till 2013 no agreement was in place and international regulation on catch limitation was 
lacking. A trilateral agreement between the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands was reached 
once again in 2014 for a period of five years.
68
 In 2014 the NEAFC did not adopt a 
recommendation with respect to mackerel, while the trilateral agreement explicitly mentioned 
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The zonal attachment of the mackerel has also gone through major changes.
70
 Currently, the 
stock is expanding northward and to the westward beyond its usual migration patterns.
71
 This 
change has led to increased presence of mackerel in Icelandic and Faroese waters.
72
 Most 
recently the mackerel has reached the waters of Greenland as well with increasing reported 
catches.
73
 Next to the ‘simple’ change in the presence of the stock, this CMR of the mackerel 
affects other stocks that are also present in these waters, including herring. A Consequence of 
this new overlap of the stocks is inter alia a significant amount of by-catch and, as such, a 





2.2 Interactions between the relevant States 
 
Keeping in mind these basic descriptions of the two fisheries we should now dive in the 
specifics of the Mackerel dispute. The Mackerel dispute refers to a disagreement going back 
to 2008.
75
 The Mackerel dispute involved several parties with different intensity of 
involvement throughout it. However, the main active parties were the EU and Norway on the 
one hand and Iceland and the Faroe Islands on the other.
76
 Accordingly, the Mackerel dispute, 
more broadly speaking, represents a several-party dispute over the quotas of two stocks, but, 
more specifically speaking, a dispute between the EU and the Faroe Islands concerning both 
mackerel and herring. When referring to the Mackerel dispute, this thesis deals with the latter 
while taking note of the involvement of all parties where relevant. 
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It all started in the Icelandic waters. After a long period of no reported catches of mackerel in 
Icelandic waters, the catches of mackerel rocketed in the late 2000s.
77
 In 2007 Iceland 
reported 36 706 tonnes.
78
 The catch soared to over 108 000 tonnes in 2008.
79
 This change in 
the catches was explained with a change in the zonal attachment of mackerel and 
corresponding with the warmer waters of the North Atlantic.
80
 This steep increase in catches 
incensed many, mainly in Scotland.
81
 Since then Iceland has been striving to be recognised as 
a Coastal State and to be involved in the agreements on the management of the mackerel. 
However, the share that Iceland wanted was not acceptable to the others, mainly the EU and 
Norway, due to its size. Initially Iceland was allocated only 2 000 tonnes and this offer 
increased to 26 000 tonnes in 2010 but was rejected and considered “unreasonable” by 
Iceland.
82
 Iceland’s catch of mackerel continued to increase in the meantime and in 2010 




The Faroe Islands being in the same boat and facing pressure at home went along with Iceland 
and also increased its quota for mackerel to 85 000 tonnes in 2010.
84
 This quota amounted to 
about 15% of the recommended TAC (previously amounting to only 4%).
85
 This increase by 
the Faroe Islands was far from appreciated in Scotland where fishermen in August 2010 
aligned their boats, forming a physical blockade for the Faroese trawler – the Jupiter – in 
order to prevent it from entering Peterhead harbour in Aberdeen and offloading its mackerel 
catch.
86
 At the same time Norway imposed a ban on the mackerel landings in its ports by the 
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Faroe Islands and Iceland.
87
 Not long after the possibility of adopting sanctions was also 
mentioned by the EU.
88
 It led to the adoption by the EU of a framework regulation for 
coercive measures,
89
 which was eventually implemented (further discussed infra). The EU 
also warned that this dispute may affect negatively Iceland’s EU membership prospective.
90
 
However, this warning hardly had any teeth as Iceland itself stopped the negotiation talks in 
2013 and in March 2015 officially withdrew its candidacy.
91
 The unilateral allocations of the 
high mackerel quotas by the Faroe Islands and Iceland continued in the following years as 
well while trying to reach a hard-fought agreement with the EU and Norway. While the 
mackerel spat was intensifying, in April 2012, the mackerel fishery got its Marine 




A further complication of the Mackerel dispute was the involvement of Greenland. The 
appearance of herring and mackerel in the waters of Greenland did not go unnoticed for the 
fishermen of the big island and they were quick to claim what was in their waters.
93
 
Greenland engaged in exploratory fishing of herring and mackerel and it was met with high 
interest by the industry.
94
 However, as the presence of these pelagic species is news, the 
industry had to catch-up by adapting its fleet.
95
 During this adaptation period Greenland had 
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to rely also on foreign fishing fleets for its exploratory fishing.
96
 This became a dividing point 
of contention during the Mackerel dispute negotiations.  The interest of the EU and Iceland to 
heavily participate in Greenland’s exploratory fishery, outside of the 2014 mackerel 
negotiations, was unacceptable to Norway.
97
 It was unacceptable because it would have de 
facto undermined any eventual agreement and would have given more legitimacy to 
Greenland’s claims, which Norway was rejecting. Eventually, as stated infra, the mackerel 
deal reached was only between the EU, the Faroe Islands and Norway and explicitly limited 





The Mackerel dispute further escalated with respect to the Faroe Islands when it extended to 
the herring quotas. This happened on 23 January 2013 when, after unsuccessful negotiations 
between the Coastal States on the TAC levels, the Faroe Islands did not become a party to the 
2013 agreement on the quotas for herring.
99
 While the Coastal States alleged in the agreement 
that the Faroe Islands withdrew from the agreement without notification,
100
 the Faroe Islands 
instantly disagreed.
101
 The Faroe Islands recalled in its response that during the consultations 
in October 2011 it expressed reservations as regards the allocation and highlighted the need 
for a process of renegotiation of the allocation of the quotas. The following year at the plenary 
meetings in October and December 2012 the Faroe Islands noted that it could not continue to 
adhere to an agreement allocating to it the same quotas as in previous years. This was also 
noted at the meeting on 23 January 2013. On 26 March 2013 the Faroe Islands unilaterally 
increased its herring quota to 17% of the recommended TAC (a 145% increase from the 
previous 5.16%). The justification for that increase was the information in the 
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On 15 April 2013 the Commission announced during the plenary debate of the European 
Parliament that trade sanctions are being considered against the Faroe Islands
103
 and even that 
the internal Commission procedure was opened for using trade instruments.
104
 On 18 April 
2013 the Faroe Islands protested against that announcement.
105
 On 17 May 2013 the 
Commission notified the Faroe Islands of its intention to identify the Faroe Islands as a 
country allowing non-sustainable fishing.
106
 The Faroe Islands responded on 17 June 2013 
that, among others, if the Commission proceeds with the adoption and implementation of the 
contemplated measures it reserves the right “to take necessary measures to instigate 




Nevertheless, the Commission continued with the procedure for adoption of measures and on 
31 July 2013 the Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture backed the Commission’s 
proposal.
108
 On 16 August 2013 Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands initiated arbitration 
under Annex VII to the UNCLOS against the EU.
109
 The dispute before the Annex VII 
tribunal concerned the interpretation and application of Article 63(1) UNCLOS with respect 
to herring.
110
 On 20 August 2013, the EU acting under Regulation 20126/2012 eventually 
adopted coercive measures with Commission Implementing Regulation 793/2013.
111
 Norway 
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also followed suit and adopted a ban against Faroese herring.
112
 In response to the EU’s 
sanctions, on 4 November 2013, Denmark on behalf of the Faroe Islands requested 
consultations with the EU, under Article 4 of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and 
Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
113
 This was the first 
time for, formally, an EU Member State to request consultations with the EU under the WTO 
DSU.
114
 After the period for consultations passed, on 8 January 2014 the establishment of a 
panel was requested by Denmark but the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel due to the 
EU’s veto on 22 January.
115
 On 26 February 2014, when the EU could veto no more, the 
panel was established.
116
 On 15 March 2014, the Annex VII arbitration had its first 
organisational meeting when it discussed the procedural framework for the arbitration and 




In the meantime, the intense rounds of negotiations continued but the EU and Norway were 
disagreeing on the quota concessions for the Faroe Islands. Eventually, on 12 March 2014, the 
EU, the Faroe Islands and Norway managed to reach an agreement on the mackerel quotas.
118
 
The agreement was reached by going above the advised TAC by ICES, leaving doubts for the 
sustainability of the agreement.
119
 The agreement also excluded Iceland, Greenland and 
Russia but left a 15.6% quota of the agreed TAC as a “Coastal State and Fishing Party 
reserve”. From the remaining 84.4%, according to the agreement, for the next five years the 
EU has 58.40%, the Faroe Islands has 14.93% and Norway has 26.67%.
120
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The EU trade sanctions against the Faroe Islands were expected to be removed after an 
agreement is reached for the allocation of the herring.
121
 However, this did not happen 
because the 2014 agreement from 28 March once again excluded the Faroe Islands.
122
 
Nevertheless, since a mackerel deal was reached, the Faroe Islands could catch 29% of its 
mackerel quota in the EU waters, where herring was not a by-catch. According to the 
Commission, the trade sanctions did not apply to that catch of mackerel.
123
 On 11 June 2014, 
an ad hoc agreement was finally reached on the herring quotas.
124
 The Mackerel dispute was 
officially ended after the EU lifted the trade sanctions on 18 August 2014,
125
 and both the 
arbitration and the WTO proceeding were terminated a few days later.
126
 While the dispute 
ended it must be reminded that an agreement on the herring quotas was not reached in 2015. 
 
 





According to Article 1 of Regulation 1026/2012, it is a framework regulation “for the 
adoption of certain measures regarding the fisheries-related activities and policies of third 
countries in order to ensure the long-term conservation of stocks of common interest to the 
Union and those third countries”. Being ‘simply’ a framework for the adoption of measures 
Regulation 1026/2012 does not have a specific legal effect on its own and it requires 
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implementing regulations. Be that as it may, the framework that is built with Regulation 
1026/2012 – its substance – is quite revolutionary in dealing with shared stocks.  
 
Before going into its substance, it is important to situate Regulation 1026/2012 in the broader 
CFP framework. Regulation 1026/2012 is not the first framework regulation for the adoption 
of measures against third countries in the area of fisheries. Regulation 1005/2008 on illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is the main such regulation.
127
 While the two 
regulations are not directly connected they do form part of the EU’s toolset for dealing with 
third countries in the area of fisheries, as recognised in Article 31 and 36 of Regulation 
1380/2013 – the central CFP regulation.
128
 To the extent that the two frameworks may be 
implemented to target the same third country, it becomes clear that action under the two 
regulations must be coordinated. It is for that reason that Regulation 1026/2012, in one of its 
recitals, states that “[i]n order to ensure that Union action for the conservation of fish stocks is 
effective and coherent, it is important that” IUU measures are taken into consideration.  
 
The complementary nature of Regulation 1026/2012 to the combating of IUU fishing was 
highlighted by the EU in a report it presented to the UN in 2012 on major developments of 
relevance to sustainable fisheries.
129
 This complementary nature is succinctly explained in the 
Impact Assessment that accompanied the proposal for Regulation 1026/2012: 
 
“It must be underlined that the results of [the quota-allocating] 
consultations are not legally binding: they cannot be called 
"agreements" with the meaning implied in international law. They are 
instead termed "arrangements" whereby the parties announce that they 
will recommend their respective fishing authorities the adoption of 
one or another measure. These authorities are free (although bound 
politically) to adopt or not the measures discussed during the 
consultations. 
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This is the reason why, in the case of mackerel, the decision of Faroe 
Islands to break the arrangements concluded in 2008 for the 
management plan could not be taken as a breach of international law 




Furthermore, “mackerel fisheries by Iceland and Faroe Islands are carried out under domestic 
law and as such, they are not illegal and therefore cannot be covered by the IUU 
legislation”.
131
 Therefore, the mechanism in Regulation 1026/2012 “would complement, but 
not overlap with, the measures adopted under the IUU Regulation. The action that is being 
explored in the present context does not target illegal fisheries strictly speaking, but fisheries 
not conducted within a legal framework guaranteeing sustainability”.
132
 Accordingly, while 
the IUU Regulation deals with fishing activities that are ‘avoiding’ the law, Regulation 
1026/2012 covers fishing activities that are completely legal but still seen by the EU as 





Turning to the text of Regulation 1026/2012, it is prudent to start with its scope. The measures 
implementing Regulation 1026/2012 may be applied in all situations where the EU and a third 
country are required to cooperate in order to jointly manage stocks of common interest 
including in a RFMO setting.
133
 Regulation 1026/2012 defines stocks of common interest as  
 
“a fish stock the geographical distribution of which makes it available 
to both the Union and third countries and the management of which 
requires the cooperation between such countries and the Union, in 




At first sight the definition of a stock of common interests as provided largely coincides with 
the one discussed by ITLOS, which overlapped with the meaning of shared stocks and Article 
63 UNCLOS. However, the text of the Regulation is not precise enough and may involve also 
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 It is also unclear what is meant by “geographical distribution […] 
which makes it available”. Should the particular stock be always also present in the EU’s 
waters? If the answer is in the negative then the geographical scope of Regulation 1026/2012 
can potentially be the world ocean. Discussing these issues further goes beyond the discussion 
here but are important points to keep in mind. With respect to third countries, the Regulation 
conveniently includes “territories enjoying self-governing status and endowed with 
competencies in the area of conservation and management of living marine resources”
136
 – 
clearly aimed at the Faroe Islands but Greenland could easily match the description as well.  
 
Article 3 sets out the criteria for identifying countries allowing non-sustainable fishing. For a 
third country to be identified by the EU as allowing unsustainable fishing two cumulative 
criteria must be fulfilled and each criterion is composed of multiple alternative elements. The 
first criterion requires this country to fail to cooperate in the management of a stock of 
common interest
 
in accordance with three alternative sets of norms. These sets are (1) the 
provisions of the UNCLOS and the UNFSA; (2) “any other international agreement”; and (3) 
any other “norm of international law”. Interestingly, the text of the Regulation does not 
explicitly state that these sets of norms must be binding on both the EU and the particular 
third country. The second criterion can be satisfied by one of two alternatives. First, the third 
country must fail to adopt necessary fishery management measures. Alternatively, the third 
country must adopt such measures “without due regard to the rights, interests and duties of 
other countries and the Union” and, when taken together with the measures of the other 
countries, the measures of the third-country measures lead to fishing activities that risk the 
stock getting in an unsustainable state. This alternative element is considered fulfilled also 
where the third-country measures did not lead to an unsustainable state of the stock only 
because of the reaction of the other countries.  
 
Article 4 lists exhaustively a wide-array of possible measures that the Commission may adopt 
by means of implementing acts. These measures include various port state measures as well as 
prohibitions on the private activities of economic operators from the EU such as reflagging, 
vessel purchasing and chartering, concluding private trade agreements and conducting joint 
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fishing operations. In adopting such measures the Commission may also identify specific 
vessels or fleets of the particular third country to which only certain measures would apply.  
 
Article 5 provides certain general requirements concerning the measures adopted under the 
Regulation. As already mentioned above, measures under Regulation 1026/2012 must take 
into account measures already taken under the IUU fishing Regulation. Other notable 
requirements are for the Article 4 measures (1) not to be applied by arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminating between countries in similar situations or by using them as a disguised 
restriction in international trade; (2) to be made effective by being complemented by imposing 
restrictions, relating to the same fish stocks, on fishing by EU vessels or on production or 
consumption within the EU; and (3) to be “proportionate to the objectives pursued and 
compatible with the obligations imposed by international agreements to which the Union is a 
party and any other relevant norms of international law”. This last requirement indicates that 
with the eventual implementing regulations the EU aims to adopt measures of retorsion rather 
than reprisals (and more particularly countermeasures). To what extent the EU achieved this 
aim is a different matter. 
Article 6 provides for a certain pre-adoption procedure that the Commission must follow with 
respect to the particular third country. First, where the Commission considers it necessary to 
adopt measures against a third country, the Commission must notify that third country and 
must immediately inform the European Parliament and the Council. Second, the notification 
must include reasons for targeting the particular third country and describe possible measures 
to be adopted by the third country to remedy the situation. Third, the Commission must 
provide the third country with a reasonable opportunity to respond in writing and to remedy 
the situation within a month of the notification. 
 
Article 7 deals with the period of application of the measures to the particular third country. 
Once imposed, the measures shall cease to apply when the targeted third country “adopts 
appropriate corrective measures necessary for the conservation and management of the stock 
of common interest”. These corrective measures must fulfil two criteria. First, they must be 
adopted either autonomously by the third country or in a context of consultations with the EU 
and other relevant countries. Second, they must not undermine the effect of the conservation 
measures of the particular stock(s) that were adopted by the EU alone or in cooperation with 
other States. The EU measures do not cease automatically but require a determination by the 
Commission to that extent in accordance with the relevant comitology procedure. In urgent 




situations relating to unforeseen economic or social disruptions the Commission is to adopt 
immediately applicable implementing acts. The ‘miscellaneous’ provisions are Article 8, 
which refers to the comitology procedure to be used with specific references to Regulation 
182/2011
137
 and Article 9, which deals with the entry into force.  
 
 
3.3 Implementation  
 
There have been only two regulations implementing Regulation 1026/2012, so far, and both 
of them are related to the Mackerel dispute. Regulation 793/2013
138
 was the first 
Implementing Regulation and with it the EU imposed sanctions on the Faroe Islands. The 
sanctions were twofold. First, it was prohibited to introduce into the EU territory, including 
for transhipment, fish or fishery products made of, consisting of or containing herring or 
mackerel caught under the control of the Faeroe Islands.
139
 Caught under Faroese control was 
defined as fish caught by Faroese-flagged vessels or by vessels of another State authorised to 
fish in the Faroese EEZ or by vessels chartered by a Faroese firm or the Faroese authorities.
140
 
Second, subject to cases of force majeure or distress under Article 18 UNCLOS, it was 
prohibited for the EU ports to be used by (1) vessels flying a Faroese flag that fish for herring 
or mackerel and (2) vessels transporting herring or mackerel or products derived from them if 




Regulation 793/2013 was not amended when an agreement was reached on the mackerel 
quotas in March 2014. This created some confusion on how the sanctions were going to be 
applied with respect to the mackerel catches in the EU or Norwegian waters. The Commission 
provided an interpretative explanation stating that mackerel catches under the control of the 
Faroe Islands within the EU and Norwegian waters will not be covered by the sanctions as 
long as they are not mixed with catches from Faroese waters.
142
 This was so even if the 
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catches were processed in Faroese plants. Regulation 896/2014
143
 was the second 
Implementing Regulation and with it the sanctions against the Faroe Islands were put to an 
end. The basis for the revocation of the sanctions was the adoption of the Faroe Islands of a 
40 000 tonnes quota (down from about 105 000 tonnes in 2013).
144
 As a side note, a curious 
point of timing has been the break-out of the Ukraine crisis and the deterioration of the EU-
Russia relations. The EU sanctions against the Faroe Islands forced it to redirect much of its 
exports to Russia,
145
 which became even more profitable with the Russian food ban against 
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Increased international cooperation is central for addressing the major challenges in the 
world’s oceans.
147
 Naturally, the duty to cooperate is a major cornerstone for the development 
of the international fisheries conservation regime.
148
 The duty to cooperate with respect to the 
conservation of fish stocks was reaffirmed in the UNCLOS
149
 and was heavily relied on for 
further developing the regime for straddling and highly migratory stocks in the UNFSA. The 
application of the duty to cooperate is, thus, a crucial part of the way the regime operates. The 
ITLOS has held that “the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of 
pollution of the marine environment”
150
 and has, subsequently, found this statement equally 
applicable to fisheries cases.
151
 The overarching argument in this section – that CMRs affect 
the application of the duty to cooperate – will be developed in the following way. First, the 
characteristics of the duty in the area of fisheries will be examined. Next, building on these 
characteristics, the discussion will show how CMRs impact the application of the duty.  
 
 
1. The characteristics of the duty to cooperate in the 
area of fisheries 
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In the literature the duty to cooperate is identified as the bedrock of international law that 
prescribes various limits on absolute state sovereignty.
152
 This duty is central to a myriad of 
issues that in one way or another are of transboundary nature, usually related to the 
environment and sharing common resources. The duty to cooperate under international law, 
while probably having certain core aspects, is quite multifaceted in the different areas of law. 
It is multifaceted in terms of its characteristics, including the specific conduct that is required 
from the respective subject of international law. This variation depends mainly on the context 
within which the duty operates. The context of the duty to cooperate is crucial because 
different contexts have different goals or objectives and have different factual specificities 
defining them. The area of fisheries conservation is such an area with very specific context 
and the duty to cooperate therein merits separate examination.  
 
 
1.1 The natural aspect 
 
The first thing to be said here is that the duty to cooperate in the area of fisheries conservation 
is tightly connected to the nature (the factual dimensions) of the sea as well as the sea-related 
developments on land. The duty to cooperate emerged as a natural solution to the tensions 
between State sovereignty, the freedom to fish and its developing legal limitations. The 
migratory nature and interconnectedness of most, if not all, fish stocks, by their very nature, 
make illusory the possibility of fishing States to fully exercise their rights and fulfil their 
duties without interacting with one another, which was also recognised by the ECJ, as shown 
below. Furthermore, due to the principle of sovereign equality, such interaction is not 
supposed to be one of imposition but rather one of consensual nature. Accordingly, 
cooperation between States, when it comes to the exploitation of shared natural resources, is 
recognised as a necessary requirement.
153
 Another important and nature-driven aspect of the 
duty to cooperate with respect to shared stocks is that the parties that are obliged to cooperate 
do not have much freedom to choose their partners: this choice is, to a considerable extent, 
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predetermined by nature. The nature-driven origin of the duty to cooperate in the area of 
fisheries is evident in the 1958 Fisheries Convention
154
 which stated in its preamble  
 
“Considering also that the nature of the problems involved in the 
conservation of the living resources of the high seas is such that there 
is a clear necessity that they be solved, whenever possible, on the 
basis of international cooperation through the concerted action of all 
the States concerned”. 
 
The ECJ went along similar lines in the Kramer case when it stated that 
 
“it none the less follows […] moreover from the very nature of things 
that the rule-making authority of the community ratione materiae also 
extends - in so far as the member states have similar authority under 
public international law - to fishing on the high seas. The only way to 
ensure the conservation of the biological resources of the sea both 
effectively and equitably is through a system of rules binding on all 





Indeed, trying to divorce the fisheries conservation law and, particularly, the duty to cooperate 
from the factual circumstances and the biological realities in the oceans is not only 
unadvisable but can render obsolete any regime. These (and other) extra-legal elements, such 
as technological and scientific, economic, social and political ones, shape the cooperative 
framework, which leads to the continuous interaction between the environment (in the narrow 
and in the wider sense) and the legal regime.
156
 The duty to cooperate thus provides a 
necessary degree of flexibility in the law, for the ocean realities to be timely 
accommodated.
157
 This flexibility is further expressed in the sub-duties that comprise the duty 
to cooperate, which will be examined now. 
 
 
1.2 The triggering aspect 
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While the duty to cooperate imposes limitations on the way States exercise their sovereign 
powers, it still provides them with wide discretion. The existing regime directs States to 
cooperate and gives them the freedom to adopt any kind of measures at any time as long as 
they contribute to the conservation and management of the fish stocks. However, giving 
complete discretion to States would have very little effect and some modalities of the 
cooperation need to be spelled out. These modalities are incarnated in its sub-duties. The 
existing regime contains a multitude of different obligations (sub-duties) with different 
characteristics that are expressions as well as triggers of the overarching duty to cooperate. 
Clear examples of this are the instances where in the UNFSA a number of obligations are 
preceded by the expression “in giving effect to their duty to cooperate States shall […]”.
158
 In 
other instances the provisions start with the obligation to cooperate and then develop it further. 
The duty to cooperate, thus, acts as a chapeau for all of the sub-duties, which trigger it, and 
unifies them towards the objective of conservation and management. The sub-duties in the 
regime are so numerous that it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to take account of every 
one of them. Rather, the discussion will examine them by grouping them together. 
  
Some of the sub-duties are static, that is, they prescribe a static end-goal or objective that can 
be reached once and for all. Such is the obligation to set up RFMOs or arrangements for the 
conservation of different fish stocks where they are lacking but are needed
159
 – once set up the 
sub-duty is discharged but not the whole duty to cooperate. Opposite to the static ones are the 
continuous sub-duties. They prescribe a continuous end-goal or objective that requires 
constant action for it to be maintained, even if reached. Many of the sub-duties in the regime 
are continuous ones, reflecting its ‘living’ nature. Such are the sub-duties requiring States, in 
giving effect to their duty to cooperate, to adopt various measures. Such are the duties to 
adopt necessary conservation measures in light of the best scientific advice – the scientific 
knowledge develops and thus the conservation measure must constantly follow it in order to 
discharge the obligation. Other examples are the duties to take measures where the viability of 
a certain stock is under threat – in order to discharge the obligation States have to adopt the 
necessary measures every single time a stock is threatened. It is not enough to do it only once. 
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Relevant are also the monitoring duties – to keep under constant review the state of the stock 




Connected to this static-continuous division, is the division between duties of result and duties 
of conduct. Example of an obligation of result in the regime is the duty to inform other States 
of adopted autonomous measures, as contained in Article 7(7) and (8) UNFSA. To the 
contrary, duties of conduct represent “an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise 
best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result”.
161
 The regime provides many 
examples of such duties. Usually, they require that States, through cooperation, adopt 
measures that ensure a particular conservation result. Such obligations ‘to ensure’ have been 
read by the Seabed Disputes Chamber (and also referring to ICJ’s decision in the Pulp Mills 
case
162
) to be duties of conduct that also imply a duty of due diligence in their exercise.
163
 In 
its discussion on “due diligence obligation”, the ITLOS quoted the Seabed Disputes Chamber 
saying that:  
 
“The content of “due diligence” obligations may not easily be 
described in precise terms. Among the factors that make such a 
description difficult is the fact that “due diligence” is a variable 
concept. It may change over time as measures considered sufficiently 
diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in light, 




This passage shows the close relationship between the duties of conduct and the continuous 
duties. In fact, most of the sub-duties in the existing regime have such continuous and 
conduct-oriented nature. Generally (and with some degree of oversimplification), the States 
are obliged to continuously exercise their best efforts to keep the stocks in a state viable for 
exploitation through the adoption of common measures. This is an expression of one of the 
basic aims of the regime – to avoid conservation gaps to the best possible extent – with the 
appearance of new challenges the States are obliged to address them accordingly. 
 
                                                 
160
 Ibid., art 6(5). 
161
 Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area 
(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber) (No 17) (Advisory Opinion, 1 
February 2011) ITLOS Reports 2011, 10, [110].  
162




 Case No 17, ITLOS, supra, n 161, [117]. 
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This overview of the sub-duties shows that the duty to cooperate represents a collection of 
various sub-duties and that it is being triggered by the existence of certain circumstances 
contained in the various sub-duties. These circumstances act as ‘safety triggers’ obliging 
States to act together in an adequate manner, in order to fulfil the overarching goal of 
conservation and management. The CMRs, it will be explained infra, involve those sets of 
circumstances that trigger the duty to cooperate through the abovementioned characteristics of 
the duty to cooperate and its various sub-duties. 
 
 
1.3 The negotiations aspect  
 
Returning to the measures that States are obliged to adopt, there is one very important aspect 
of the regime that needs to be examined – the negotiations – as they will often be the initial 
stages of cooperation.
165
 The regime contains many continuous obligations of conduct with 
respect to the adoption of various measures. These obligations also have one important 
dividing characteristic – their addressees. Where a single State is the addressee, it has a due 
diligence obligation to ensure that certain result is achieved and maintained, which necessarily 
requires the adoption of certain national measures. Where a plurality of States is obliged to 
take measures together the situation is different due to the issue of sovereignty. Unless 
otherwise explicitly provided, these States have the duty to negotiate such measures, to seek 
to agree, but not an obligation to actually adopt them. Hence, the duty to negotiate serves as a 
connecting link and deserves special attention because in this way it is central to the regime 
for shared stocks.  
 
The duty to negotiate, as opposed to the duty to reach an agreement,
166
 is also conduct-
oriented. As the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) has stated “an obligation to 
negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement”
167
 and the ICJ has continued in 
the same suit.
168
 Under the UNCLOS the coastal states are obliged only to “seek to agree” on 
the necessary measures as prescribed in Article 63 UNCLOS. In the UNFSA, next to the seek-
to-agree formula there is also the “make every effort to agree” formula. However, even if 
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obliged ‘only’ to seek to agree or make every effort, the duty to negotiate has real legal 
content
169
 with a multitude of emanations, which, if not observed, can lead to its violation. 
The Tribunal in the Lac Lanoux case confirmed this when it said that: 
 
“the reality of the obligations thus undertaken is incontestable and 
sanctions can be applied in the event, for example, of an unjustified 
breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of the 
agreed procedures, systematic refusal to take into consideration 
adverse proposals or interests, and, more generally, in cases of the 




This also emerged from the ICJ decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, which stated 
that 
  
“the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a 
view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a 
formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the 
automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the 
absence of agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct 
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the 
case when either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating any modification of it”.
171
   
 
Accordingly, if States negotiate in good faith and try to reach an agreement on the respective 
measures and they fail, the duty to cooperate will not be violated. This is a particular and 
inherent weakness of the regime, which was also at the heart of the Mackerel dispute. The 
duty to negotiate is, thus, crucial for the application of the duty to cooperate. As such, it will 
also be important for the discussion in the next sub-section where the impact of CMRs on the 
duty to cooperate is examined. Before continuing, however, there is one more important 
characteristic of the duty to cooperate in the area of fisheries that needs to be mentioned.  
 
 
1.4 The equity aspect 
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The duty to cooperate in the area of fisheries conservation is underpinned and informed by the 
principle of equity. This is because the resources of the seas and the oceans, including 
fisheries, are to be utilised equitably and this equitable utilisation is to be effectuated through 
the duty to cooperate. In the preamble of the UNCLOS the contracting parties recognised the 
desirability to establish through the UNCLOS a legal order which inter alia will promote “the 
equitable and efficient utilization” of the sea and ocean resources. The parties also bore in 
mind that achieving this will contribute to the realisation of “a just and equitable international 
economic order”. The ECJ echoed this in Kramer when it said that the “only way to ensure 
the conservation of the biological resources of the sea both effectively and equitably is 
through a system of rules binding on all the states concerned” (Emphasis added).
172
  
The equity principle is encapsulated, albeit without being mentioned as such, in several 
fundamental UNCLOS and UNFSA provisions that cover issues well beyond only equity. The 
fisheries-related provisions are Articles 56(2), 87(2) and 116 UNCLOS. Article 56(2) 
UNCLOS obliges States, in the exercise of their rights and duties within their EEZs, to have 
due regard to the rights and duties of other States. Article 87(2) UNCLOS echoes this with 
respect to the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas. Article 116 UNCLOS continues in 
saying that, while States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, 
this right is subject to “the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States”. Articles 
7, 8 and 16 UNFSA also reiterate the due regard obligation.  
 
The link between having due regard to the rights and duties of other States and the principle 
of equity is exemplified in the ICJ’s pronouncements in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases. The 
ICJ recognised that 
 
“[i]t is one of the advances in maritime international law, resulting 
from the intensification of fishing, that the former laissez-faire 
treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has been 
replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights of 
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Consequently, the ICJ continued, States have the obligation to inter alia examine together 
“the measures required for the […] equitable exploitation of those resources”.
174
 The ICJ 
found negotiations to be the best fitting solution in that case. One of the objectives in these 
negotiations, the ICJ held, was “to balance and regulate equitably questions such as catch-
limitations and share allocations”.
175
 Furthermore, the ICJ directed the parties before it to 
conduct their negotiations on the basis of paying in good faith “reasonable regard to the legal 
rights of the other” and thus “bringing about an equitable apportionment of the fishing 
resources based on the facts of the particular situation”.
176
 Accordingly, the role of equity in 
allocating fisheries resources, which is effectuated through cooperation, could hardly be 




Three roles of equity have been identified with respect to the apportionment of water 
resources,
178
 which can easily be borrowed for the situations concerning sea and ocean 
resources. These roles are complementary and can occur simultaneously.
179
 First, equity 
allows a decision-maker to reach a just or equitable solution when faced with more than one 
possible interpretation of the law.
180
 Second, equity lacks specific legal content
181
 and, instead, 
serves as a tool for considering the relevant circumstances.
182
 Third, equity assists in the 
establishment of the specific legal content of rules which do not provide answers for specific 




This equity, which underpins and informs the duty to cooperate, however, must be 
differentiated from ex aequo et bono, which need not be based on law, subject to consent of 
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 The ICJ importantly clarified in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case that the 
necessary negotiations are not “a matter of finding simply an equitable solution, but an 
equitable solution derived from the applicable law”.
185
 On this point the ICJ referred to its 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases where it said that “it is not a question of applying equity 
simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the 
application of equitable principles”.
186
 In the case of the conservation of shared fish stocks, 
the rule of law applied is the duty to cooperate and its respective sub-duty, in the fulfilment of 
which the parties are required to have due regard to each other’s rights and duties, which in 
turn includes equitable considerations. As such, the nature of the principle of equity in the 




The operation of the equity aspect of the duty to cooperate is aiming to prevent inequitable 
burden sharing between States in the conservation and management of shared stocks. In 
particular, it aims to prevent situations where one State carries an excessive burden of 
conservation due to the irresponsible fishing practices of another State with which a particular 
stock is being shared. Such inequitable burden sharing may particularly arise in CMR 
situations and the equity principles, as it will be shown below, will serve to bring the burden 
sharing (back) to an equitable state. 
 
 
2. The impact of changes in the migration routes of 
shared stocks on the duty to cooperate 
 
All of the aspects of the duty to cooperate that have been discussed above show one clear 
leitmotif – flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances that affect the status of 
the shared stocks. This sits perfectly in line with the qualification given to the UNCLOS (and 
by extension to the UNFSA) as a “Constitution for the Oceans”.
188
 The UNCLOS is a living 
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instrument and should be treated as such in order for it to stay alive and relevant in its 
entirety.
189
 This is especially so with respect to its fisheries provisions in light of the constant 
developments in this area, this thesis discussing a prime example of them – CMRs. They 
involve sets of changing circumstances that can practically take the form of myriad different 
constellations, which need to be briefly outlined here. Rather than addressing them one by one, 
the discussion will be based on certain general (common) threads of these constellations, 
which this author identified and which will referred to later-on. The proposed grouping is 
made with the understanding that the constellations can be equally grouped along other lines. 
However, it is maintained that the ones proposed here do provide a workable point of view for 
the purposes of the present discussion. 
 
The first common thread appears where due to a CMR the nature of a shared stock is changed. 
Example of this would be when the stock changes from being simply a transboundary stock to 
being a straddling one or even a discrete one
190
 and vice versa. The second common thread 
appears where the nature of the stock is not changed but the relevant States (or their statuses) 
change. Examples of this common thread would be where a transboundary or a straddling 
stock enters the EEZ of yet another State or, conversely, leaves the EEZ of one of the coastal 
States. With the transboundary stocks it is the relevant States that change, while with the 
straddling it is only their status as coastal States that changes. A curious twist of this thread is 
where a stock also crosses the maritime boundaries of RFMOs. That is, it could happen that a 
stock changes its migration route in such a way that it is no longer confined within the 
Convention Area of one RFMO but transcends to the Area of a neighbouring RFMO 
(assuming there is one). In this case there is no change in the coastal status of a State but in 
the status of States as previously exclusive managers of the stock. Such thing is thought to 
have happened with redfish when going beyond NEAFC’s Area and entering NAFO’s 
Area.
191
 The third common thread appears where the stock changes only its zonal attachment 
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while preserving its nature and not involving changes in the relevant States. Example of this 
would be where a transboundary stock between two States increases its zonal attachment in 
State A at the expense of its zonal attachment in State B.  
 
The CMRs, thus outlined, represent a variety of different circumstances that affect the 
application of the duty to cooperate in many different ways by triggering it through its various 
sub-duties. The multitude of triggers that the CMRs can activate can be grouped in two 
separate (yet connected) perspectives – the voluntarist and the conservationist perspectives. 
These two perspectives are closely related to the two aims of the regime that were identified 
above – avoiding both conservation gaps and inequitable burden sharing. The conservationist 
and the voluntarist perspectives differ, mainly, in terms of the amount of discretion left to the 
relevant States for addressing the change. Evidently from their names, the voluntarist 
perspective is the one providing more freedom. The specifics of the two perspectives and the 
way the application of the duty to cooperate is affected fall to be discussed next. The 
discussion on each of the perspectives will be structured as follows. First, in order to provide 
the legal context, the discussion will start with the main characteristics of each perspective 
and the provisions from the regime on which the perspective is based. Second, it will be 
examined how a CMR triggers the duty to cooperate from each perspective. 
 
 
2.1 The voluntarist perspective  
 
2.1.1 Legal context 
 
The voluntarist perspective could be said to be the default perspective when a CMR occurs. It 
deals with situations where a CMR occurs but there are no threats for the viability of the stock 
in question (or its associated species). In that sense the voluntarist perspective is alternative to 
the conservationist perspective. However, by virtue of the very nature of the ocean realities, 
the voluntarist perspective may be superseded by its counterpart due to a subsequent 
deterioration of the stock’s viability (or its associated species), irrespective of the 
circumstances that brought about the decrease. The voluntarist perspective is based on the 
discretion given to the relevant States by the flexibility of the duty to cooperate.  
 
This flexibility needs to be examined in a greater detail here and this will be done by looking 
at the actual provisions that provide for it. The examination of the provisions will show, in 




general, the degree of discretion left to the States and, in particular, it will show that the 
regime provides for similar but, still, different solutions for transboundary and straddling 
stocks. These differences are due to the variations in the rights and obligations of States 
within the EEZ and on the high seas. As it will be shown infra, this distinction bears 
important consequences for the way the duty to cooperate is affected. The discussion will be 
divided along the lines of the two different types of shared stocks – first, the transboundary 
and, second, the straddling stocks. 
 
Since the transboundary stocks migrate through the EEZs of two or more States, the 
discussion will start by looking at the basics of the EEZ regime. The main rights, freedoms 
and duties within the EEZ are set out in Part V of the UNCLOS. Within the EEZ the coastal 
State, with respect to fisheries, has sovereign rights and jurisdiction as well as certain 
obligations. Some of these rights and obligations are generally outlined in Article 56 
UNCLOS. In its first paragraph it states that the coastal State has sovereign rights in exploring, 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources therein, including the living ones. 
It also states that the coastal State has jurisdiction for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment as well as other rights and obligations as provided for in the UNCLOS. 
The second paragraph states that within the EEZ the rights and obligations must be exercised 
and performed with due regard to the rights and duties of other States.  
 
Effectively, the coastal State is the master of its EEZ when it comes to the fisheries. Other 
States have a very limited access to these resources under Article 62 UNCLOS. In promoting 
the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources, coastal States must determine its 
harvesting capacities and, where they are lower than the TACs it has determined, access to the 
surplus must be given to other States. However, this access is not direct; that is, it happens 
through agreements and arrangements and pursuant to the conditions, laws and regulations 
that the coastal State has put in place. Article 61 UNCLOS sets out rules for the conservation 
of the living resources within the EEZ, which are examined infra under the conservationist 
perspective. As it can be seen, the coastal States are given very wide discretion within their 
EEZs with respect to natural resources.  
 
These basic and default provisions are further developed in Part V for specific types of living 
natural resources. In the case of the shared fish stocks it is Article 63 UNCLOS that provides 
some more specificity in the shape of a basic cooperative framework for the shared stocks. Be 
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that as it may, the exclusive authority bestowed to the costal State under Articles 56, 61 and 
62 UNCLOS is not lost in the case of shared stocks.
192
 The authority is, however, largely 
insufficient in such cases for reaching management and conservation goals.
193
 The first 
paragraph of Article 63 UNCLOS deals with transboundary stocks, while paragraph two deals 
with straddling stocks.
194
 Article 63(1) UNCLOS requires from the coastal States to seek to 
agree “upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and 
development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part” either 
directly or through an international organisation.  
 
The language of Article 63(1) UNCLOS does not explicitly speak of a duty to cooperate but it 
does lay down one specific aspect of the duty – to seek to agree, that is – to negotiate. As 
already observed, the negotiation obligation itself has real legal content, as confirmed by the 
Lac Lanoux Tribunal and by the ICJ.
195
 Article 63(1) UNCLOS requires negotiations in good 
faith – an obligation of conduct and not of result.
196
 It is a weak
197
 and not very 
consequential
198
 obligation as there is no duty to enter into the said agreements.
199
 It is the 
result of a deliberate choice of the drafters, considering the failed attempt of Argentina to 
have the provision amended to “be obliged” to agree.
200
 Article 63(1) UNCLOS only requires 
that the relevant States seek to agree in good faith and should this fail the default provisions – 




                                                 
192
 W Burke, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention Provisions on Conditions of Access to Fisheries Subject to 




 Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia, ‘Article 63: Stocks occurring within the exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States or both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond 
and adjacent to it’ in M Nordquist et al (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A 
Commentary (vol 2, Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1993) 639, 640.  
195
 I Shearer, ‘High Seas: Drift Gillnets, Highly Migratory Species, and Marine Mammals’  in T Kuribayashi and 
E Miles (eds) Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A Framework for Cooperation (Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu 
1990) 244. 
196
 E Hey, supra, n 156, 81. 
197
 R Churchill and D Owen, supra, n 33, 94. 
198
 W Burke, supra, n 192, 106. 
199
 F Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 1989) 61. 
200
 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. XII, Report of the 
Chairman of the Second Committee, 24 August 1979, UN Doc. A/CONF.62L/42 (1979), 92, 93, [42]. 
201
 K Mfodwo, M Tsamenyj and S Blay, The Exclusive Economic Zone: State Practice in the African Atlantic 
Region (1989) 20 ODIL 445, 461; R Churchill and A Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed, MUP, Manchester 1999) 
294. This should not be called into question even by looking at the award of the Tribunal in Barbados v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, which stated that the parties are under a duty to agree (thus omitting ‘seek’). This 
language has been explained in the literature rather with the commitments made by the agents of the two States 
before the Tribunal than with a new reading of Article 63. See B Kunoy, supra, n 10, 698. 




The language of Article 63(1) UNCLOS, as it will be seen infra, gives more discretion to the 
coastal States than its counterpart for straddling stocks. Not only are the State obliged to only 
“seek to agree” but the obligation relates only to the measures that are “necessary to 
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development” of the transboundary stocks. 
Coordinating measures and measures ensuring conservation and development are not very 
demanding instances of cooperation. The States are still free to agree to much more detailed 
forms of cooperation if they so wish but are not obliged to. Another freedom of choice 
concerns the form of measures and whether they would be a direct arrangement of in the form 
of an RFMO. This point is developed in much more detail with respect to straddling stocks 
within both the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Furthermore, in the UNFSA, as it can also be seen 
infra, the regime is developed even more in terms of the approaches to be adopted during 
cooperation, such as the precautionary and the ecosystem approaches. However, the UNFSA 
and the high seas provisions do not apply to the transboundary stocks and the coastal States 
are, thus, given much greater discretion.  
 
The high seas presence of the straddling stocks makes the regime applicable to them more 
intricate. There are close resemblances between the transboundary and the straddling stocks 
regimes but there also are important differences, especially with respect to the discretion of 
the relevant States. These variations can be detected first at the level of the basic default 
provisions. In the general provisions of Part VII “High Seas”, Article 87 UNCLOS provides 
inter alia that all States have the freedom to fish on the high seas and that they have to 
exercise this freedom “with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the 
freedom of the high seas” – mirroring Article 56(2) UNCLOS. Article 87(1)(e) UNCLOS also 
subjects the freedom to fish on the high seas to Section 2, to which the discussion will now 
turn. 
 
Article 116 UNCLOS sets out the right for all parties to the UNCLOS to have the right for 
their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas. However, this freedom of the high seas 
fishing is not unfettered. There are three sets of caveats introduced in Article 116 UNCLOS, 
which are (1) the treaty obligations of the parties; (2) the rights and duties as well as the 
interests of coastal States; and (3) the rest of the Section 2 provisions. Article 117 UNCLOS 
introduces the duty of the parties to adopt necessary measures for the conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas with respect to their own nationals. Such measures are to be 
taken by the States themselves or in cooperation with other States. In the UNCLOS 
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Commentary, the adoption of autonomous measures by States is not considered to provide a 
way for avoiding cooperation altogether.
202
 The Legal Affairs Office in the UN law of the sea 
division considered that taking measures was “designed to be a cooperative activity, with 
States acting individually in applying to their nationals the conservation measure determined 
in cooperation with other States”.
203
 Support for this is found more generally in the text of 
Article 118 UNCLOS, which sets out the duty to cooperate for the management and 
conservation of the living resources on the high seas. A specific duty to enter into negotiations 
with a view of taking necessary conservation measures, as a form of cooperation, is 
prescribed for the States the nationals of which exploit identical living resources or different 
resources but in the same area. To that extent and where appropriate regional or sub-regional 
fisheries organisations are to be established. However, even if the negotiations are not 
successful, States are still obliged to take the relevant measures with respect to its nationals 




Article 119 UNCLOS builds on the provisions of Article 118 UNCLOS as it provides an 
indication of what constitutes necessary conservation measures, which include the 
determination of allowable catch. In particular, the States are obliged to take measures on the 
basis of the best scientific evidence available to them and which are designed in line with the 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the particular stocks. In doing so the States must have 
regard to the biological, ecological, economic and environmental factors as well as generally 
recommended international minimum standards. Article 119(2) UNCLOS elaborates on the 
scientific information side of the duty to cooperate. It requires all States concerned to 
contribute and exchange regularly data relevant to the fisheries conservation through 
competent international organisations. The determination of allowable catch is by its very 
nature a multilateral cooperative effort, as required by Article 118 UNCLOS. It mentions 
prominently the role of the best scientific evidence available. Thus, it is not prohibited to take 
measures on a different basis where such evidence is unavailable or inadequate, which reflects 
the precautionary approach to fisheries conservation.
205
 However, where such evidence is 
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present it must be used as a basis for the conservation and management measures. In this way 
the scientific evidence plays an important role for the way States should conduct themselves 
during the negotiations undertaken to discharge the duty to cooperate. 
 
These default rules for the high seas draw a very different framework for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources from the one within the EEZ. They also do not exclude the 
application of the EEZ regime with respect to straddling stocks. This creates a problem for the 
management of such stocks. Article 63(2) UNCLOS complements the default high seas 
provisions with the hope to resolve that problem. Article 63(2) UNCLOS requires from the 
coastal States, together with the States fishing beyond the EEZs, to seek to agree “upon the 
measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks” on the high seas, again, either 
directly or through an international organisation. As in the case of the transboundary stocks, 
the relevant States only have a negotiating obligation of conduct – to seek to agree. The 
negotiation obligation in Article 118 UNCLOS, although put in different terms, resembles 
closely the requirements of Article 63(2) UNCLOS.
206
 The language in Article 63(2) 
UNCLOS, with respect to the measures to be agreed, is also a bit more limiting than in the 
case of transboundary stocks – it is not limited to coordinating measures and measures 
ensuring the conservation and development of the stocks but refers to ‘necessary’ measures. 
However, it must be noted that these measures are with respect to only the high seas part of 
the straddling stocks. This leaves wide open the possibility of having conflicting measures for 
the same stocks within the different maritime zones. With the aim to avoid such conflicting 
measures and, generally, to strengthen the regime for straddling (and highly migratory) stocks 
the UNFSA was adopted. While it is explicitly stated that the UNFSA does not contradict the 
UNCLOS it goes a long way in providing in greater detail the modalities of the cooperation 
that States must enter into. These modalities need to be examined here.  
 
Article 5 UNFSA sets out the general principles that States must follow when giving effect to 
their duty to cooperate under the UNCLOS for the purpose of conservation and management 
of shared stocks. These principles apply mutatis mutandis to the relevant measures adopted by 
the States within their EEZs. The general principles include a long list of environmental 
factors to be taken into consideration, including the precautionary approach as well as an 
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ecosystem-based approach; capacity limiting; consideration of artisanal and subsistence 
fishers; data collection; scientific research promotion; and effective monitoring control and 
surveillance. Article 6 UNFSA builds on that list by further elaborating on the way the 
precautionary approach is to be applied. As stated in the beginning, this thesis operates on the 
assumption that a CMR is established, which implies certain availability of adequate scientific 
information. As such, greater detail on this point will be spared. In any event, the 
precautionary approach could have an important role to play until the CMR is established, due 
to the unpredictability of the CMRs in terms of time, scale, and effects on other species.  
 
Article 7 UNFSA is one of the UNFSA cornerstones. It starts by restating Article 63(2) 
UNCLOS and the obligation to seek to agree on the necessary measures. Article 7 UNFSA 
also states that this negotiation obligation is without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the 
coastal States within their EEZs and the right of all States for their nationals to fish on the 
high seas. Article 7 UNFSA then moves to elaborate on this negotiation obligation by 
introducing the principle of compatibility. Article 7(2) UNFSA states that conservation and 
management measures adopted for the high seas and the EEZs must be compatible in order to 
ensure the conservation and management of the stocks in their entirety. In order to achieve the 
compatibility of these measures the relevant States are obliged to cooperate. Article 7 UNFSA 
also provides a list of several factors that must be taken into account in determining the 
compatibility. It is required that States ensure that the measures are not harmful to the living 
marine resources as a whole and take into account (1) the coastal State measures applicable 
within its EEZ and ensure that their effectiveness is not undermined; (2) previously agreed 
measures by relevant coastal States and high seas fishing States as well as by RFMOs or 
arrangements; (3) the biological characteristics of the stocks and the geographical 
particularities of the region and of the stock’s occurrence; and (4) the dependence of coastal 
States on the particular stocks. In agreeing on the compatible measures, Article 7(3) UNFSA 
requires that States make every effort to agree on them within a reasonable period of time. 
Failing to do that, Article 7(4) UNFSA refers to the dispute settlement mechanisms, which 
will be considered in the next section.  
 




The list of factors does not seem to be hierarchal and in finding compatible measures a bottom 
up and a top down approaches have been identified as possible.
207
 In the former, the coastal 
State has the lead, while in the latter leading are the RFMO members or States participating in 
a direct arrangement. The lack of priority to the one or the other method creates a problem of 
authority as exemplified in the Mackerel dispute. In situations of disagreements, the 
disagreeing parties may each take one of the approaches and insist on it. The irreconcilable 
result of taking both mutually exclusive approaches clearly contradicts the obligation in 
Article 7(2) UNFSA that the measures “shall be compatible”.  
 
Another cornerstone of the UNFSA is highlighting the role of the RFMOs and arrangements 
as mediums of cooperative action. With the UNFSA, the RFMOs and the various direct 
arrangements between the relevant States have become the focal points for the fulfilment of 
the duty to cooperate.
208
 Part III of the UNFSA elaborates on the mechanisms for international 
cooperation. It strongly emphasises the use of RFMOs as a way for States to “pursue 
cooperation” and “give effect to their duty to cooperate”.
209
 However, it also gives the choice 
of direct cooperative mechanisms – arrangements. The UNFSA even allows for formal non-
participation in certain occasions as long as the conservation and management measures 
established by such RFMO or arrangement are applied. Where a State is not interested in a 
particular fishery the regime does not oblige that State to get involved with the RFMO or 
arrangement in question. Consequently, such States, pursuant to their duty to cooperate, have 
to forbid their nationals from fishing the particular stock.
210
 Effectively, the UNFSA provides 
wide discretion to States in choosing whether and how to participate in the conservation and 
management of a given shared stock but is also clear that access to the fisheries resources is 
forbidden to States that do not participate or, otherwise, do not observe the applicable 
measures. Where no RFMOs or arrangements exist the relevant States are obliged to 
cooperate to establish such RFMOs or enter into appropriate arrangements to ensure 




The UNFSA also gives a lot of freedom for States to choose how the envisioned RFMOs and 
arrangements will be formed and will function. This freedom is, nevertheless, streamlined to 
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some extent and some basic characteristics are made mandatory in a number of UNFSA 
provisions. Such characteristics are the material and geographical scopes, the main functions 
and activities, the participation, development and the transparency in the decision-making 
provided mostly in Articles 9 to 13 UNFSA. For the present discussion of interest are only 
some of these characteristics.  
  
As the duty to cooperate with respect to shared stocks applies both within the EEZ and on the 
high seas,
212
 both RFMOs and arrangements can be used for cooperation in both maritime 
zones. The UNFSA provides a freedom to agree on the application ratione loci of the RFMO 
or the arrangement.
213
 This freedom is (not very consequentially) qualified as account must be 
taken of Article 7(1) UNFSA and the regional and sub-regional characteristics.
214
 Usually, 
RFMOs are given the competence to deal with cooperation on the high seas and only 
exceptionally, on a request by a particular party, to adopt measures or give advice applicable 
within the EEZ. Furthermore, the measures adopted are usually subject to the objections of 
the RFMO members, which can render the measures (recommendations) non-binding.
215
 The 
freedom to vote against or eventually object to measures derives from the underlying 
negotiating nature of the duty to cooperate. Conversely, when it comes to the EEZ, direct 
arrangements are usually used. These arrangements often constitute political agreements 
rather than treaties and are, therefore, not binding and problematic to enforce.
216
 While they 
create enforcement issues, these non-binding instruments have certain aspects, which make 
them preferable to treaties.
217
 Nevertheless, since the conservation and management measures 
can have a wide array of substantive incarnations, some of the direct arrangements can indeed 
take the form of binding agreements.
218
 In terms of application ratione materiae, the relevant 
States are free to include in the RFMOs and the arrangements all species in the defined 
geographical area or only particular stocks. 
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Since the formation and functioning of an RFMO or an arrangement are an expression of a 
cooperative effort, the participation therein does not depend completely on the interests and 
desires of one State. The effectiveness of the cooperation is equally depending on the parties 
involved and on the intensity of the cooperation. At the heart of the participation question is 
the issue of “real interest”.
219
 Article 8(3) UNFSA provides that  
 
“States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned may become 
members of such organization or participants in such arrangement. 
The terms of participation in such organization or arrangement shall 
not preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall 
they be applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or 
group of States having a real interest in the fisheries 
concerned.”(Emphasis added)  
 
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 9(2) UNFSA, where an RFMO or an arrangement is being 
formed through cooperation, the cooperating States must inform other States “which they are 
aware have a real interest in the work of the proposed organization or arrangement of such 
cooperation”. These provisions show that, while States have wide discretion in the form of 
cooperation, they do not have the freedom to arbitrarily exclude other States having real 




Unfortunately, the UNFSA does not explain what real interest means and when exactly it will 
be met, which can easily give rise to disputes.
221
 However, considering the nature of shared 
stocks and its influence on the duty to cooperate, it is submitted that there should be no 
question about the existence of ‘real interest’ with respect to the coastal States, through the 
EEZs of which the stocks migrate.
222
 Such States objectively have real interest in the stock 
due to their sovereign right over the natural resources present in their EEZs. The coastal 
States have real interest even if previously they have not participated in the particular fishery. 
The reason for non-participation is irrelevant – it does not matter whether it was due to lack of 
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economic interest or because the fish was previously lacking or was in small abundance 
within the EEZ. The existence of real interest for non-coastal States is much harder to 
determine as it will be reliant much more on factors other than the objective status of a State 
as a high seas fishing State for the particular stock.
223
 The situation is even more complicated 
where a transboundary stock becomes a straddling one due to a CMR. The vagueness of the 
qualification ‘real interest’ can create problems for States seeking to participate in already 
established RFMOs or arrangements. A problem of such nature was present in the Mackerel 
dispute when Iceland and, later-on, Greenland, asked to be included in the negotiations of the 




Article 8(2) UNFSA provides an interesting twist to the issues of participation and the 
qualification of the participating States. It states that “any interested State” may initiate 
consultations with the view that appropriate arrangements are established to ensure the 
conservation and management of the stocks. This provision has special relevance for CMR 
cases because the consultations may be initiated by any interested State and not any State 
which has real interest. This is an important difference as it explicitly allows for a much wider 
group of States to join the process of adoption of relevant measures. 
 
 
2.1.2 Triggering the duty to cooperate 
 
Where a CMR occurs, irrespective of which common thread materialises, the rights and duties 
of the relevant States under the voluntarist perspective are getting affected automatically. 
However, the way in which the rights and duties are affected and which are the relevant States 
vary, depending on the common thread in question. These two issues will be considered first, 
before examining in more detail the triggering of the duty to cooperate. 
 
The relevant States 
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The issue of which are the relevant States can be very complicated in a CMR situation due to 
the vagueness of the undefined qualifications in the UNFSA of ‘real interest’ and ‘any 
interested State’. The term ‘relevant States’ is used here independently from the interest-based 
qualifications used in the UNFSA and includes all States that can potentially fish a particular 
shared stock as of right, thus, excluding the arrangements for fishing in foreign EEZs.  
 
The relevant States issue is simpler in the third common thread and more complicated in the 
first and the second ones. It is relatively simple in the third common thread because the 
relevant States are not directly changed by the CMR. Whether the States that are actually 
involved in the fishery changes, will be a separate choice made by these States on the basis of 
the actual degree of zonal attachment variation and will not be automatically predetermined. 
Nevertheless, through these choices, which are, effectively, expressions of interest, the third 
common thread may indirectly lead to a change in the number of interested States or States 
having real interest in a particular stock. In the first and in the second common threads the 
issue is more complicated because the relevant States can be changed directly by the CMR 
and it is also possible that there is indirect influence as in the third common thread.  
 
The essence of the second common thread is the change of the relevant States or of their 
status. The change of the relevant States is clear with transboundary stocks – they may 
increase as well as decrease, following a CMR. With the straddling stocks the relevant States 
remain the same but the changes in their statuses can have influence on their classification as 
interested States or States with real interest. In the first common thread the relevant States will 
almost always change due to the changes in the nature of the stock.
225
 In the first common 
thread the changes of the relevant States are quite abrupt. If a transboundary stock becomes 
straddling the relevant States would include a great number of States due to the fishing 
freedoms on the high seas. In such cases it would be even harder to evaluate real interest 
because fishing opportunities are becoming available for the first time to a much bigger 
number of States. Conversely, where a straddling stock becomes transboundary just a small 
number of States will suddenly have an exclusive role in the conservation and management of 
a resource that previously may have been accessed by a much bigger number of States. 
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Irrespective of how real was the interest of the non-coastal States before the CMR, the 
sovereign rights over the natural resources within the EEZ will exclude them. 
 
These changes in the relevant States are important because the voluntarist perspective applies 
only to the post-CMR relevant States. The voluntarist perspective applies in this way because 
it is strictly based on the rights and duties provided in the regime. That is to say, for example, 
the pre-CMR coastal States of a transboundary stock cannot rely on Article 63(1) UNCLOS to 
exclude other States from the negotiations of the conservation and management measures if 
that stock has become straddling. Accordingly, while the rights and duties of all (old and new) 
relevant States are affected by CMRs it is only the relevant States after the CMR that can 
trigger the duty to cooperate through its sub-duties.  
 
Affecting the rights and duties of the relevant States 
 
At this juncture it is necessary to consider how the rights and duties of the relevant States are 
actually affected. In the first common thread the impact of the CMR on the rights and duties 
of the relevant States is substantial because with the change of the nature of the stock there is 
a change in the applicable sub-regimes. As it was shown above, the sub-regimes for 
transboundary and straddling stocks, while similar, contain important differences. Such 
differences relate to the involvement of different maritime zones within which the number of 
States exercising fishing rights and fulfilling the respective obligations is drastically different 
and the substance of these rights and obligations is also quite different. The discretion the 
relevant States have for dealing with transboundary and straddling stocks is also different. 
Essentially, the rights and obligations of the relevant States with respect to the conservation 
and management of the particular stock are changed when the first common thread 
materialises. That is not to say, however, that the law has changed by the CMR, but that a 
different part of the law is applicable due to the factual changes that have occurred.  
 
In the second common thread the impact of the CMR on the rights and duties of the relevant 
States is not as substantial as in the first common thread but also involves important changes. 
With respect to States within the EEZs of which a shared stock appears or disappears, the 
rights and obligations differ substantially. To give two indicative examples, in the case of a 
transboundary stock, the CMR completely changes the terms of access of the particular State 
to that fishery; and in the case of a straddling stock, the basis for access is strengthened or 




weakened when the stock, respectively, enters or leaves the EEZ. Effectively, for such States 
this change determines whether or not Articles 56, 61 and 62 UNCLOS are applicable to them 
with respect to the particular stock. This makes a huge difference as it happened with Iceland 
and Greenland when mackerel was found in their waters. With respect to the other relevant 
States, their rights and obligations are affected only in terms of scope. This is to say that, 
while the other relevant States do not experience a change in the applicable law, the scopes of 
some of the rights and obligations they have widens or shrinks geographically and, 
respectively, applies to more or less States.  
 
In the third common thread the rights and duties are also affected, albeit in a more limited 
manner than in the other common threads. Most notably, the applicable part of the law and the 
scope of the rights and duties are not changed. While they remain the same, the rights and 
duties are affected under the voluntarist perspective because (and to the extent that) the zonal 
attachment of the stocks is a factor to be taken into account in the conservation and 
management of the particular shared stock. For straddling stocks, the UNFSA makes this 
explicitly a factor to be considered by stating that account must also be taken of “the extent to 
which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction” in determining 
compatible conservation measures. There is no such explicit statement for transboundary 
stocks in the UNCLOS. However, it would be wrong to assume that the zonal attachment is 
not a factor to be considered for transboundary stocks as well. The existing regime gives 
States sovereign rights over all natural resources present within their EEZs. This does not 
change when the resources increase, even if it is at the expense of a decrease within the EEZs 
of other States. The bigger the share of the stock within a given EEZ, the bigger the intensity 
of the fishing that can be undertaken legally and vice versa, which affects the fishing interests, 
rights, and duties of the relevant States. This is not to say that the amount that each party can 
fish changes proportionately to the change in the zonal attachment of the stock, due to the 
additional factors to be considered,
 226
 but that the zonal attachment change is not 
inconsequential and does affect the rights and duties of the relevant States. This conclusion is 
also supported by the characteristics of the duty to cooperate, particularly, the equity aspect.  
 
The triggering of the duty to cooperate 
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Having considered the issues of the relevant States and the affected rights it is now necessary 
to turn to the issue of triggering the duty to cooperate in more detailed manner. The first thing 
to be said in this regard is that, in order for the duty to cooperate to be triggered, it is not 
enough that the rights and duties of the relevant States are affected. There is an additional 
element (circumstance) that must be present, which is the essence of the voluntarist 
perspective – the will of at least one of the relevant States to address the CMR. If all of the 
relevant States agree, explicitly or implicitly, not to address the CMR they may do so, under 
the voluntarist perspective. However, once one of the relevant States requests the CMR to be 
addressed, the others are obliged to respect it.  
 
This obligation not to ignore the cooperation calls of the relevant States flows from three of 
the aspects of the duty to cooperate in the area of fisheries. First, the natural aspect of the duty 
to cooperate dictates that ocean realities must not be ignored and that the cooperating partners 
are predetermined to a certain extent. The calls for cooperation arising from CMRs are aimed, 
by definition, at addressing (changed) ocean realities and may come from States that are made 
new cooperating partners by these very same ocean realities. Second, the triggering aspect of 
the duty to cooperate is based on the presence of a multitude of particular circumstances 
which require different kinds of action. When such circumstances appear and are called upon 
they cannot be ignored. Third, the equity aspect requires due regard for the rights and duties 
of other States. Due regard for the fishing rights and obligations of other States is achieved 
inter alia by equitably allocating fishing resources through cooperation, considering the 
existing circumstances, and, as such, avoiding inequitable burden sharing in the conservation 
and management of the stocks.  
 
Even where an equitable result is achieved, if the circumstances change and a party questions 
the equitableness and requests that the result is revisited through cooperative methods, it must 
not be ignored. While the ICJ correctly stated, generally about equitable principles, that 
“equity does not imply equality […] nor does it seek to make equal what nature has made 
unequal”,
227
 it is submitted here, that equity does seeks to redistribute equitably what nature 
has also redistributed. Article 8(2) UNFSA exemplifies the role of these aspects of the duty to 
cooperate in limiting the freedom of the relevant States to ignore calls for cooperation. It 
obliges States to enter into consultations in good faith which can be initiated by any interested 
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State with the view to adopt appropriate measures. It does not oblige States to reach an 
agreement but does oblige them not to ignore calls for cooperation.  
 
Being that as it may, the triggering of the duty to cooperate in and of itself does not say much 
about the scope and the content of the sub-duty(ies) through which the duty to cooperate is 
triggered. The array of possible variations of triggered sub-duties is so wide that a detailed 
examination goes beyond the point of discussion here. Instead, the discussion will now look at 
the factors on which these cooperation particularities depend. First, reflecting the natural 
aspect of the duty to cooperate, they depend on the factual circumstances of the occurring 
CMR. With respect to scopes of application, where the relevant States change due to a CMR, 
the scopes ratione personae as well as ratione loci of the sub-duties change. For example, 
where a straddling stock enters the EEZ of a new State, the scope of application of Article 7 
UNFSA expands; the measures that the new State would adopt within its EEZ will also be 
covered by the compatibility obligation. With respect to the substantive content of the 
respective sub-duties, it is not changed by the CMRs. What changes is the set of applicable 
sub-duties that can be triggered by any of the relevant States. For example, where a straddling 
stock becomes transboundary, none of the relevant States can trigger Article 7 UNFSA on the 
compatibility of EEZ and high seas measures because there will no longer be any high seas 
measures applicable to that stock.  
 
Second, reflecting the triggering aspect of the duty to cooperate, the cooperation 
particularities depend also on the will of the relevant party that triggers the duty to cooperate. 
This is central for the voluntarist perspective. It can happen that different relevant States 
trigger different sub-duties and even with different addressees due to the discretion the regime 
provides. For example, where a transboundary stock becomes straddling, one of the pre-CMR 
relevant States may request that the CMR is addressed but only with respect to quota 
allocations and only by this original group of States. However, if some of the new relevant 
States want to join the fishery on the high seas they can request that the CMR is addressed in 
a more comprehensive manner and even that an RFMO is formed, if the stock was previously 
managed by a direct arrangement.
228
  Another consequence of the triggering aspect, which 
limits the discretion of the parties, is the triggering chain reaction with some sub-duties. Using 
the transboundary to straddling stock example again, if the relevant States decide to address 
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the CMR by adopting measures also for the high seas, they cannot ignore the compatibility 
obligation of Article 7 UNFSA – they have to go all the way in that regard.  
 
Third, reflecting the equity aspect of the duty to cooperate and its inherent elements of 
fairness and justice, the cooperation particularities are influenced by the good faith obligation 
and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are enshrined in the existing regime
229
 and have 
been proclaimed as part of “generally recognized principles and rules of international law”.
230
 
Good faith is to be observed both where requests for cooperative action are made and where 
these requests are received. Where requests are made they are to be well-founded on evidence 
of CMRs and must not be made in an abusive manner. That is to say, while the requests as 
such can concern all parts of the existing measures, because nothing prevents their complete 
renegotiation should the relevant States so desire, the requests that can actually trigger sub-
duties under the voluntarist perspective are limited. They are limited to the practical issues 
relating to the CMRs. For example, using small-scale CMRs or CMRs with very limited 
economic, ecological, etc. consequences to request and demand changes of conservation and 
management measures of the given stock that go beyond the particularities of the CMR will at 
the very least be questionable from the perspective of good faith. Conversely, when requests 
are made, the addressees of these requests must not ignore them, as already explained above. 
Responding to the cooperation requests and the exchanges that will follow phase into the 
stage of negotiations, for which acting in good faith is just as important. 
 
The negotiations aspect of the duty to cooperate becomes relevant for the issue of fulfilling 
the triggered obligations. The cooperative effort that requires multilateral agreement on 
certain actions or measures will need to undergo a process of negotiations. In situations of 
pre-CMR measures (which would usually be the case) these measures will have to be 
renegotiated in good faith. Article 8(2) UNFSA can be applied here. It states that 
 
“States shall enter into consultations in good faith and without delay, 
particularly where there is evidence that the straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks concerned may be under threat of over-
exploitation or where a new fishery is being developed for such stocks. 
To this end, consultations may be initiated at the request of any 
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interested State with a view to establishing appropriate arrangements 
to ensure conservation and management of the stocks. Pending 
agreement on such arrangements, States shall observe the provisions 
of this Agreement and shall act in good faith and with due regard to 
the rights, interests and duties of other States.” 
 
Article 8 UNFSA is titled “cooperation for conservation and management” and its first 
paragraph reiterates that coastal States and States fishing on the high seas have the obligation 
to pursue cooperation to ensure effective conservation and management of the relevant stocks. 
Following, Article 8(2) UNFSA provides some basic procedural aspects for this cooperation. 
It is especially relevant for CMR cases because it explicitly addresses two situations that can 
also arise as a result of a CMR. For example, a new fishery may be developed as a result of a 
CMR as it happened with Greenland, which started exploratory fishing in its EEZ for 
mackerel. The threat of over-exploitation could appear where a CMR is not addressed 
appropriately but this is to be discussed under the conservationist perspective. Moreover, 
Article 8(2) UNFSA is not limited to these two situations as it introduces them with the words 
“particularly where”, which shows that the procedural aspects have wider scope of application.  
 
The initial stage of the negotiations is consultations, as Article 8(2) UNFSA shows. These 
consultations must be entered into in good faith and without delay. That means that not only 
the cooperation requests may not be ignored, but they should be promptly answered. The 
consultations may be initiated by any interested party, without definition being provided of 
‘interested’. There is no indication of whether some States must be excluded or not. The 
qualification ‘interested’ may be interpreted even to mean that the moment a State requests 
consultations it is showing interest and it is to be considered as interested as such. As it has 
been noted above, it is important that this qualification is different from States with ‘real 
interest’ whatever it means. Article 8(2) UNFSA does not specify which must be the States 
that have to enter into the consultations (the addressees). This open-endedness exemplifies the 
discretion the relevant States are given by the regime under the voluntarist perspective, which 
was discussed above.  
 
During the negotiations for the appropriate measures, Article 8(2) UNFSA requires that States 
observe the UNFSA and act in good faith and with due regard to the rights, interests and 
duties of other States. These conduct-oriented obligations restate obligations that States 
already have under the existing regime and the added value of their additional mentioning is 
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not immediately clear. It may be said that the added value is that they inform the way the 
negotiating States must conduct themselves during the negotiations. It may also be read to 
mean that non-negotiating States must nevertheless take note of the negotiations and, possibly, 
not to act in a way that will frustrate them. This part of Article 8(2) UNFSA is yet to be 
further clarified in practice. 
 
The basic procedural aspect of Article 8(2) UNFSA can be applied by analogy to the 
respective negotiations for transboundary stocks. This is because the logic of Article 8(2) 
UNFSA runs on the basic characteristics of the duty to cooperate, which applies to both 
transboundary and straddling stocks. There is nothing that makes the obligation to enter into 
consultations with the view to agree on appropriate measures exclusively applicable to 
straddling stocks and not transposable to regime for transboundary stocks. The sovereign 
rights over the natural resources within the EEZ are not going to be prejudiced precisely 
because this procedure is based on the duty to cooperate, which is applicable for the 
conservation and management of transboundary stocks. Naturally, the provisions will be 
applied mutatis mutandis, which means, for example, that the list of the interested States 
initiating the consultations and the addressees of the cooperation requests will be much more 
limited. 
 
In the Mackerel dispute the issue of renegotiation of measures was very problematic. 
Greenland and Iceland were adamant to be included in the new agreements and, together with 
the Faroe Islands, have argued for a change in the TAC allocations, all because of the CMRs 
of mackerel and herring. The EU and Norway, on the other side, were very hesitant in 
respecting these claims. While this seems to be an instance of disagreement on the law, it may 
not necessarily be the case. During the Mackerel dispute, in a joint statement on mackerel, 
Commissioner Damanki and the Norwegian Minister Berg-Hansen stated that the “EU and 
Norway recognise that the change in the migration pattern in recent years, due to the 
expansion of the stock, justifies a modified sharing arrangement”.
231
 Immediately after saying 
this, the statement expresses dissatisfaction with Iceland’s skyrocketing increase of catches in 
a very short amount of time.  
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This statement points not so much to a disagreement on the obligation to answer the call for 
cooperation through renegotiating the relevant conservation and management measures, in 
this case TACs, but rather a disagreement on facts such as abundance levels and, 
consequently, on the equitable level of the new TAC allocations. This conclusion was very 
clearly supported during a reporting by the Commission on the issue of trade sanctions and 
subsequent developments before the Fisheries Committee of the European Parliament.
232
 In 
particular, the Commission representative stated that it was confirmed that there was far more 
mackerel in the Faroese and Icelandic waters and that their rights to get a larger share must be 
recognised, even more so for Iceland, which was not a coastal State before but now is. 
However, there was no mentioning of Greenland and as far as herring was concerned it was 
stated that higher abundance was not shown. 
 
Disagreement on the law, however, may have arisen on whether a de minimis rule applies to 
the calls for cooperation. Regulation 793/2013 stated that the Commission 
 
“examined the existing scientific literature on the subject and only 
found statements pointing to occasional occurrence of herring in 
Faeroese waters for longer time in the season, but did not find any 
reference allowing to interpret this phenomenon as a stable or 




This implies that if there was a “stable or permanent increase in abundance” the EU would 
have acted differently. Unfortunately, from the available public exchanges, the views of the 
parties involved in the Mackerel dispute are not completely clear on this point and it is 
unclear whether there was a dispute on this point of the law. In any event, it must be clarified 
that such de minimis rule is unfounded in the existing regime, unlike in the 1958 regime. 
Instead, the existing regime relies on the good faith obligation of all relevant States, which is 
in line with its decentralised and cooperative nature.  
 
 
2.2 The conservationist perspective 
                                                 
232
 See the web-streaming of the Committee meeting of 17 October 2013 (see 12:19:00 et seq) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20131017-0900-COMMITTEE-
PECH#managehelp> accessed 1 October 2015. 
233
 Regulation 793/2013, supra, n 45, recital [17]. 




2.2.1 Legal context 
 
The conservationist perspective deals with the situations where the relevant States lack the 
discretion to choose whether or not to address a CMR and its consequences. In particular, the 
conservationist perspective derives from the provisions in the regime that prescribe the rights 
and obligations of the States dealing with the conservation of marine (fisheries) resources. A 
brief overview of these provisions is needed here in order to better explain the application of 
the perspective. This overview will build on the discussion of the regime that was provided 
for the voluntarist perspective. The overview here will focus on the sovereign right to explore 
and exploit, conserve and manage natural living resources of the waters superjacent to the 




Article 61 UNCLOS deals with conservation of the living resources and sets out the general 
rules concerning the determination of allowable catch of living resources by the coastal State 
and the maintenance of these resources through proper measures.
235
 Article 61(1) UNCLOS 
provides the default rule that the coastal State determines the allowable catch of the living 
resources within its EEZ. This default rule is, however, limited by the following paragraphs, 
which set out the factors to be considered in determining the catch.
236
 Article 61(2) UNCLOS 
requires the coastal State to ensure that the living resources in its EEZ are not endangered by 
over-exploitation by taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it and taking 
proper conservation and management measures. As appropriate, it is required that the coastal 
State cooperates with competent global, regional or sub-regional international organisations in 
achieving this end. The exact modalities of the cooperation required are not clear from the 
language of the provision. It is noteworthy that the cooperation here is between the coastal 
State and the relevant international organisations and not also with other States as it has been 
suggested during the drafting.
237
 The other subparagraphs provide some specifics to be 
considered by the coastal State while devising its conservation measures. Article 61(3) 
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UNCLOS requires that the measures thus taken are in line with the MSY of the stocks and “as 
qualified” by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements 
of developing States and taking into account fishing patterns, stocks’ interdependence and 
generally recommended international minimum standards. Article 61(4) UNCLOS builds on 
the interdependence aspect of the stocks and requires that the effects of the measures on 
associated or dependent species is taken into consideration.  
 
With respect to the high seas, the regime similarly imposes conservationist restrictions on the 
freedoms of the States. The freedom to fish on the high seas is generally recognised in Article 
87 UNCLOS and further reaffirmed in Article 116 UNCLOS. However, this freedom is not 
unfettered. Among others, there are conservationist limitations that are imposed on the States. 
Articles 117 and 118 UNCLOS require States to take necessary conservation measures and 
Article 119 UNCLOS elaborates on what constitutes necessary conservation measures and on 
issues to be taken into consideration. In particular, the States are obliged to take measures that 
are designed “to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield”. As in the EEZ, these measures are to be based on 
the best scientific knowledge and be “as qualified” by relevant environmental and economic 
factors. Furthermore, in taking such measures the States are obliged to consider the effects of 
such measures on associated species with the view to maintain or restore the populations of 
such associated species “above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously 
threatened” 
 
The UNFSA complements these conservationist obligations and requires action in certain 
situations where stocks are in an ‘undesirable’ state. In Article 5 UNFSA the MSY-level 
requirement is reiterated. Furthermore, where necessary, it is also reiterated that measures 
must be taken for associated species or species that otherwise belong to the same ecosystem 
with the view to maintain or restore “populations of such species above levels at which their 
reproduction may become seriously threatened.” Article 5 UNFSA also requires that 
biodiversity in the marine environment is protected and that measures are taken to ensure that 
fishing effort levels “do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fishery 
resources”.   
 
Article 6 UNFSA, which deals with the application of the precautionary approach, further 
provides for situations where the regime requires action from States. In implementing the 
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precautionary approach, States are required inter alia to determine stock-specific reference 
points on the basis of best scientific information available and in the event that these reference 
points are exceeded to take action to restore the particular stock. Article 6(5) UNFSA requires 
“[w]here the status of target stocks or non-target or associated or dependent species is of 
concern” that States “subject such stocks and species to enhanced monitoring in order to 
review their status and the efficacy of conservation and management measures”. Moreover, 
Article 6(7) UNFSA prescribes that measures are also to be taken in case of a natural 
phenomenon having adverse impact on the status of shared stocks. This is relevant here 
because such ‘adverse impact’, while not defined in the UNFSA, may easily be connected 
with a CMR. In the case of such natural phenomena the States are obliged to adopt emergency 
measures “to ensure that fishing activity does not exacerbate such adverse impact” as well as 
“adopt such measures on an emergency basis where fishing activity presents a serious threat 
to the sustainability of such stocks”.  
 
The conservation measures that the regime requires, both within the EEZ and on the high seas, 
are also an “element in the protection and preservation of the marine environment” as the 
ITLOS has famously stated.
238
 The protection and preservation of the marine environment is 
an obligation imposed by Article 192 UNCLOS. While States have the right to exploit their 
natural resources, they are to do so in accordance with their marine-environment duty.
239
 This 
duty is formally separate from the duty to cooperate as it is not a sub-duty but it does affect 
the way States have to cooperate. 
  
 
2.2.2 Triggering the duty to cooperate 
 
Having briefly considered the conservationist provisions of the regime, now it falls to explain 
how the duty to cooperate is triggered. Due to its different legal foundation, the 
conservationist perspective also triggers the duty to cooperate in a different way. Like with 
the voluntarist perspective, the conservationist one requires that two circumstances are present 
for the duty to cooperate to be triggered. These circumstances, however, differ. Contrary to 
the voluntarist perspective, under the conservationist one, the occurrence of a CMR does not 
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automatically affect the conservationist rights and obligations of the relevant States. That is, 
next to a CMR there is an additional circumstance that must be present, which, put in very 
general terms, is a threat for the viability of the particular stock. Accordingly, when a CMR 
occurs and a threat materialises, the rights and duties of the relevant States will be triggered 
and they cannot choose to ignore the CMR and its consequences as they could under the 
voluntarist perspective. The issues of which are the relevant States and how their rights are 
affected also need some attention under the conservationist perspective because they differ 
from the voluntarist one.  
 
The relevant States 
 
With respect to the relevant States, the conservationist perspective has different scope. The 
relevant States are not all States that can potentially exercise their rights to fish a particular 
shared stock. In particular, the relevant States are more limited to the States that are actually 
involved in the fishery or otherwise impact the fishery for which the conservationist 
perspective applies. Impacting States would be the ones that, while not fishing the particular 
stock, are coastal States, which have sovereign rights over it, or which fish associated species. 
The reasons for this more limited scope are the different nature and rationale of the 
perspective. Where the viability of a stock is threatened the main solution is lowering the 
fishing effort and catch and the discussion would usually evolve around the question of how 
low. For States on the other end of the world that are not involved in the particular fishery in 
no way whatsoever, there is no obligation to do anything. Accordingly, which are the relevant 
States depends more on the actual involvement of the States with the fishery than on the 
common threads of the CMR. The common threads are influential to the extent that they 
determine that States can (or cannot) be involved in the fishery, which was examined above.  
 
Affecting the rights and duties of the relevant States 
 
Under the conservationist perspective the rights and obligations of the relevant States are 
affected by being activated, without their content being changed in any way, due to the 
particularities of the given CMR. These rights and duties are activated after being dormant, 
either because they have been previously fulfilled or because the circumstances they address 
have never previously existed. For example, such dormancy is present with the 
conservationist provisions in the regime that oblige the States to ensure that living resources 
are maintained above certain safety levels: as long as the living resources are above these 
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levels these provisions are in the background and dormant. Such is the case where the existing 
regime requires, in particular, that the stocks, both within the EEZ and on the high seas, are 
sustained at MSY levels; that the effects on associated species are considered with the view to 
maintain or restore their populations above seriously threatening levels for their reproduction; 
and where coastal States are required to ensure the stocks within their EEZs are not 
endangered by over-exploitation. Accordingly, once a threat for the living resources surfaces 
these provisions are activated and action is required by the States. The way the rights and 
obligations of the relevant parties are affected depends mainly on the ecological consequences 
that flow from the CMRs. The common threads are relevant where the nature of the stock is 
being changed because this determines whether the transboundary or the straddling stocks 
regime is applicable, together with the differences in their conservationist provisions. 
 
The triggering of the duty to cooperate 
 
Triggering the duty to cooperate under the conservationist perspective, as with the voluntarist 
perspective, is not very indicative of what the relevant States must actually do and a closer 
look must be taken at the sub-duties. Here as well the number of possible sub-duties that can 
be triggered is too big for a one-by-one discussion. Instead, the focus will be on the main 
factors influencing the scope and the content of the sub-duties, keeping also in mind the 
corresponding discussion for the voluntarist perspective and the role of the aspects of the duty 
to cooperate.  
 
The leading factors under the conservationist perspective are the factual particularities of the 
CMR and its consequences. The will of the parties is barely present. Whether a particular sub-
duty is triggered does not depend on the will of the parties but on whether the viability of the 
particular stock is affected in a given way. For example, the relevant States have no freedom 
on whether or not to subject stocks to enhanced monitoring in order to review their status and 
the efficacy of the applicable measures, where these stocks are of concern, under Article 6(5) 
UNFSA. The same is the situation where a natural phenomenon has significant adverse 
impact on the status of the particular stocks – States have to act in accordance with the 
triggered provisions. Naturally, the relevant States still have the residual freedom to adopt 
additional measures but this is only complementary due to the application of the voluntarist 
perspective by default. Furthermore, as indicated in the discussion on the relevant States 
above, they also can vary somewhat under the conservationist perspective depending on the 




circumstances. This is especially the case with the States that have impact on the particular 
stock. Most often this can be the case where associated species are concerned and where the 
States fishing for the different associated species do not overlap but measures must be taken 
for all. Another important aspect of the conservationist perspective is the desired result of the 
triggered duty to cooperate. While in the voluntarist perspective the eventual aim is generally 
to reach an agreement with little constraints on its form and substance, in the conservationist 
perspective the triggered sub-duties have a particular conservation goal to be achieved.  
 
The procedure for fulfilling the triggered sub-duties under the conservationist perspective 
does not differ much from the one under the voluntarist perspective. Here as well the 
negotiations aspect of the duty to cooperate is central. The regime does not provide for 
different procedures depending on the subject-matter of the negotiations.
240
 The provisions of 
Article 8(2) UNFSA can be applied for the conservationist perspective, as one of the 
explicitly provided situations therein shows – where stocks are under threat of over-
exploitation. After all, the negotiations start by being initiated by somebody. However, the 
main difference between the two perspectives, in terms of negotiation, is that under the 
voluntarist one the cooperation request is the trigger for the respective sub-duties, but under 
the conservationist perspective the request is simply a formality required by the already 
triggered sub-duty. 
 
In the Mackerel dispute, the conservationist perspective had an ambivalent role to play. The 
CMR that occurred fell under the voluntarist perspective. The relevant States had to address it 
due to the requests made by some of the relevant States – Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. Their claims were met with fierce opposition almost amounting to outright ignoring. 
When these three relevant States decided to then exercise their sovereign fishing rights in 
their EEZs, coupled with the resilience of the EU and Norway to step back, the status of the 
herring stock worsened. Whether the cooperation failure under the voluntarist perspective 
actually got to turn into a situation under the conservationist perspective needs further 
analysis with empirical data, which will not be done here. However, it is clear that even if did 
not transform, it was surely down that road.  
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Another conservationist perspective aspect in the Mackerel dispute related to the issue of 
associated species. As indicated above, a shared stock that is in a predator-prey relationship 
with another stock changes its migration route conservation issues can arise as a result. In the 
Mackerel dispute, while not getting that far, there was such an issue for the Faroese fishermen. 
While on the one hand, mackerel was seen as an increased resource it was also a predator for 
the juveniles of other stocks the fishermen targeted, such as cod, haddock and saithe.
241
 If the 
Faroes did not act to increase their mackerel catches, the CMR could have led to a 
deterioration of these associated stocks.  
 
When it comes to the measures the EU imposed against the Faroe Islands, traces of the 
conservationist perspective can also be found. The justification the EU put forward for both 
the framework regulation and the implementing one is the environment. This transpires from 
the initial calls for Regulation 1026/2012, from its preparatory works and its final shape. They 
talk about sustainable fishing – clearly a conservationist perspective element. Be that as it 
may, the EU never suggested that the framework or the implementing regulations had a legal 
basis in the regime for the oceans – because it clearly does not. As it will be seen in the next 
section, the regime does not provide a basis for any of the relevant States to adopt such 
autonomous measures against each other in the event of unsuccessful cooperation. This is so 
even though sustainable use of straddling stocks is one of the main objectives of the UNFSA 
(Article 2) and is often mentioned throughout the UNFSA. The regime only obliges States to 
take measures relating to their own activities and their own vessels and, within their own 
EEZs, for all vessels.   
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So far, this thesis discussed the duty to cooperate and its application in the case of CMRs. It 
showed the multitude of twists and turns that can impact the duty to cooperate in a variety of 
different ways. Now the thesis will look at certain consequences of the application of the duty 
to cooperate. In particular, the attention will be on the consequences of unsuccessful 
cooperation. Unsuccessful cooperation can equally arise in situations where the relevant 
States breach their duty to cooperate as well as where, without breaching their duty, they fail 
to negotiate an agreement. Note will be taken of the main challenges that the relevant States 
can face without going into excessive detail. There are three main issues that this author 
considers most pressing and in need of examination: (1) the status of pre-existing (pre-CMR) 
agreements, (2) dispute settlement, and (3) self-help measures.  
 
Unlike the discussion so far, the examination here will also rely on the openness of the regime 
and will often go beyond the regime by applying general international law. This openness 
refers to the fact that the existing regime is not self-contained
242
 and allows for the application 
of external sources of international law. This is true for both primary and secondary norms. 
Support for this can be found in the fact that both the UNCLOS and the UNFSA provide in 
their preambles that matters not regulated therein “continue to be governed by the rules and 
principles of general international law”. Furthermore, the preparatory works of neither the 
UNCLOS nor the UNFSA suggest any intent of the drafters to exclude the complementary 
application of norms external to the regime. Even more, there is nothing in the regime clearly 
providing for such exclusion with respect to secondary norms, which is required due to the 
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1. Status of pre-existing agreements 
 
As explained in section III, the primary way to address a CMR, whether under the voluntarist 
or the conservationist perspective, is through negotiation. In some situations this negotiation 
could involve the adoption of entirely new measures and agreements that have no bearing on 
the pre-existing ones (if any). However, in most cases, it would happen that this negotiation 
will actually encroach on pre-existing measures and agreements, which will be, effectively, 
renegotiated in whole or in part. The question then arises what becomes of these pre-existing 
agreements and measures where new agreement is lacking. To what extent the CMRs can 
affect the status of pre-existing agreements in such situations? Can these agreements be 
terminated due to the CMRs? The answers of these questions are to be found in the law of the 
treaties. However, before answering them, it must be examined which are the pre-existing 
agreements that can be affected.  
  
 
1.1 Types of pre-existing agreements 
 
The CMRs of shared stocks can have impact both in the EEZs and on the high seas, 
depending on the common thread that is materialised. Furthermore, the gravity of the impact 
can vary as well, depending on the circumstances of the particular CMR. For these reasons the 
number of the potential agreements that can be affected and the extent to which they can be 
affected will also vary. Their main connecting link between these agreements is the extent to 
which they govern the particular shared stock. These agreements can be systemised in 
different ways along the different characteristics that they have. They can be, to say the 
least,
244
 (1) binding as well as non-binding; (2) applicable within the EEZ or on the high seas 
(or both); (3) adopted in the context of an RFMO or a treaty.  
 
Non-binding agreements can be direct political agreements such as the ones negotiated 
between the relevant States in the Mackerel dispute or non-binding recommendations of an 
RFMO. Conversely, the binding once can be treaties, with or without the need for protocols to 
implement them, as well as binding RFMO measures. On the high seas, the agreements would 
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almost exclusively be related to an RFMO – RFMO measures as well as the constitutive 
instrument(s) of the RFMO. These would be affected the most where a straddling stock 
becomes transboundary – in the case of a single-stock-specialised RFMO (or other kind of 
arrangement) its whole existence could be put to a question. Within the EEZ, the types of 
agreements that can have bearing on a particular shared stock are numerous.
245
 Such can be 
agreements on technical cooperation, boundary agreements, access agreements under Article 
62 UNCLOS, friendship agreements etc.
246
 Specialised fisheries agreements also can vary 
among themselves. They may simply refer to terms and conditions of the issued licences and 
the applicable national laws or they can set out in full detail the terms and conditions for 
fishing a particular stock.
247
 However, even where details such as quota allocations are 
included in a treaty provision, it would be unlikely that they are fixed for a long period 






1.2 Reaching new agreement 
 
Where the relevant States do reach an agreement in the negotiations for addressing a CMR, 
there are very few legal issues that may arise due to the overriding importance of the State 
consent. In such a case the pre-existing agreements may be partially or fully amended, 
modified, suspended or even terminated,
249
 if the parties so wish. The constraints that the 
States may face can only be related to the particular framework/context of the negotiations. 
For example, in the case of binding RFMO instruments or decisions of a special bilateral 
commission (both are usually annual), once an agreement is renegotiated, either a new 
provisional instrument would be adopted, if the rules of the RFMO or the commission allow 
for it, or the parties will have to wait for the annual measure to lapse. In the case of a treaty on 
access rights and/or quotas, usually, it would be a framework one with a periodically 
negotiated agreement (also usually annual) in the form of a protocol. In such a case the 
RFMO situation applies mutatis mutandis and either the protocol is amended or it is left to 
lapse.  
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It must be stated here that the existing regime does not specify what instruments must be used 
for the duty to cooperate to be fulfilled, except where it requires for an RFMO to be formed, 
which would imply a treaty. As such, the existing regime recognises that international 
cooperation does not require a binding or even a written document.
250
 If the parties have 
actually reached a renegotiated agreement, it is its implementation through provisional and 
practical arrangements that would be important, in the spirit of the existing regime, which 
gives freedom for the means as long as the end is achieved. 
 
 
1.3 Not reaching new agreement 
 
Where no agreement is reached, the status of pre-existing agreements may get more 
complicated. Lack of agreement may occur due to unsuccessful negotiations or because the 
relevant States simply decided not to act. In the case of unsuccessful negotiations, one or 
more of the parties that are unhappy with the existing agreements may wish to, nevertheless, 
change the status of the agreement through any available autonomous action. The situation is 
simpler with non-binding agreements, because the State that is unhappy with the status quo 
may easily disrupt it without any legal (but not some political) consequences, as the Faroes 
did in the Mackerel dispute.  
 
However, in the case of binding agreements, such as RFMO measures or treaties, the freedom 
to act is much more limited. The triggering of the duty to cooperate and renegotiations that are 
to follow do not have the force of releasing the particular State from its existing obligations. 
In such cases, the State in question must have recourse to the law of the treaties, which allows 
autonomous actions to lead at the most to a suspension or termination of an agreement. Some 
of the provisions of section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) 
are relevant in that regard.
251
 The suspension or termination grounds provided in the VCLT 
that are relevant here are treaty provision, material breach, supervening impossibility of 
performance, and fundamental change of circumstances. The VCLT also provides for 
denunciation or withdrawal where a treaty is silent on these matters, including termination.  
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Where a treaty provision so provides, a State may withdraw from the treaty, in conformity 
with its provisions.
252
 The treaty may also be terminated or suspended in regard to all parties 
or only to a particular party if this is provided for in the treaty and the relevant provisions are 
observed.
253
 Where the treaty does not provide for termination, denunciation or withdrawal, a 
State may nevertheless do so where “it is established that the parties intended to admit the 
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal” or where such a right may be implied by the 
treaty’s nature.
254
 In such cases, the intention to denounce or withdraw must be notified at 
least twelve months in advance. It may be added here that where the agreement or the 
measure has an expiry period, the State in question may simply wait for it and decline to 
renew it. 
 
Material breach of a treaty is another important ground for treaty termination or suspension.
255
 
It gives the right to the other party or parties to the agreement to suspend or terminate a treaty 
where a provision essential for the object or purpose of the treaty was violated.
256
 In a CMR 
case this ground may be of use where a fisheries treaty includes certain allocation provisions 
of the catch and they are violated by one of the parties and the conservation and management 
of the particular stock is hindered.  
 
A rather exceptional ground for termination, withdrawing or suspension is the supervening 
impossibility of performance. It can be invoked where fulfilling the treaty’s provisions has 
become impossible due to “permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable 
for the execution of the treaty”. The impossibility must not be the result of a breach by the 
party invoking it. Such exceptionality may be present in CMR situations. For example, in the 
case of an access agreement (treaty) under Article 62 UNCLOS, a party may invoke 
impossibility of performance where the stock in question has left the EEZ to which the treaty 
is applicable. 
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Fundamental change of circumstances is yet another exceptional ground for the termination, 
withdrawing or suspension of a treaty.
 257
 Similar to the two previously discussed grounds, it 
involves certain change in circumstances but the three are completely separate grounds with 
separate legal bases and application.
 258
 This ground was developed through centuries in order 
to answer the practical needs of the States that were not answered by the other existing 
termination grounds.
259
 It is well-founded in international law and has been relied on by the 
EU and recognised by the ECJ.
260
 Fundamental change of circumstances is based on grounds 
of equity and justice
261
 and serves a narrow but very important role in the treaty relations 
between States. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case the ICJ famously held that: 
 
“International law admits that a fundamental change in the 
circumstances which determined the  parties to accept a treaty, if it has 
resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations 
imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party affected 




Furthermore, the change in question “must have increased the burden of the obligations to be 
executed to the extent of rendering the performance something essentially different from that 
originally undertaken”.
263
 This ground can be applied even only to some of the provisions of a 
treaty,
264
 which will be especially relevant where fisheries provisions have been included in 
treaties dealing with other matters as well. 
 
Fundamental change of circumstances is probably the ground of highest relevance for pre-
existing binding agreements in the context of a CMR. It is not hard to imagine situations of 
CMRs in whichever common thread that could increase the burden of the obligations to the 
extent where their performance amounts to something essentially different from what was 
initially agreed upon. This is tightly connected to the aim in the existing regime to prevent 
inequitable burden sharing between States in the conservation and management of shared 
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stocks. It is driven by equitable concerns just like this ground. Being this as it may, 
fundamental change of circumstances cannot be invoked in any CMR situation. This is 
because of the de minimis rule that its qualification ‘fundamental’ introduces. Even if a State 
has the right to request consultations with the view to renegotiate the applicable measures the 
moment a CMR occurs, it takes a CMR with very big consequences to allow that State to 
successfully invoke a fundamental change of circumstances and terminate, suspend or 
withdraw from a valid binding agreement that imposes certain conservation and management 
obligations on it, including quota allocations. Another mandatory requirement is that the 
change must not have been foreseen by the parties. While in most cases a CMR would not be 
anticipated, in others it may be. This is especially so with the increasing awareness of the 
threat of CMRs and their relationship with environmental change. Furthermore, where a CMR 
has occurred once and an agreement has been renegotiated, it is questionable to what extent it 
can be argued that another CMR has not been foreseen. In any event, where all requirements 
are satisfied, if the invoking State faces a general refusal from the other relevant States to 
renegotiate the terms of the treaty, it can eventually be released from its obligations under that 
treaty due to the fundamental change of circumstances.    
 
In the Mackerel dispute, neither of these grounds were discussed or relied upon, as the 
relevant conservation and management measures were not included in a treaty but in a non-
binding political instrument. Furthermore, the CMR did not involve a change in the nature of 
the stock (from straddling to transboundary) and, as such, did not bring up issues on the 
relevance of the NEAF Convention. Lastly, the CMR has not yet involved stocks leaving the 
EEZ of a coastal State in order to bring up the issue of the relevance of the access agreements 
with that State. 
 
 
2. Dispute settlement 
 
Dispute settlement in the area of the LOS has a long history, has generated a considerable 
amount of international litigation and has evolved greatly for the past century.
265
 The dispute 
settlement in the area of fisheries is a prominent part of the LOS dispute settlement and has 
                                                 
265
 See P Rao, ‘Law of the Sea, Settlement of Disputes’ in E Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (OUP, Oxford 2012) and A Boyle ‘Problems of Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Settlement 
of Disputes Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks’ in O Stokke (ed) Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay 
of Global and Regional Regimes (OUP, Oxford 2001) 91. 
CONSEQUENCES OF UNSUCCESSFUL COOPERATION 75 
 
 
been discussed at length in the literature.
266
 The discussion here will examine the extent to 
which the existing regime provides solutions for settling disputes arising out of the specifics 
of the CMRs. That is, it suggested here that CMR disputes would most likely revolve around 
more specific points of contention due to CMRs’ very nature and characteristics. Looking at 
the available dispute settlement mechanisms from the perspective of these more specific 
points of contention (thus not claiming exhaustiveness) will provide a better account of the 
suitability and adequacy of these mechanisms for resolving CMR disputes. The focus of the 
discussion will initially be on the solutions provided by the UNCLOS and the UNFSA and 
then will turn to the role of external agreements in the fisheries dispute settlement. 
 
 
2.1 The UNCLOS and the UNFSA 
 
As it was already shown, the rights and duties of the relevant States can be considerably 
affected in many different ways by CMRs, which also makes the possible CMR-related 
disputes no less nuanced. The dispute settlement mechanisms that the regime provides in Part 
XV UNCLOS are also very diverse and represent a system of two-tiered, interlinked, 
voluntary, and compulsory procedures.
267
 In case of a dispute on the interpretation or 
application of the UNCLOS, States are obliged to settle that dispute, in accordance with 
Article 2(3) UN Charter, through peaceful means, choosing from the means listed in Article 
33(1) UN Charter.
268
 Procedurally, when a dispute arises the States are obliged to 
expeditiously exchange views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means. 
However, a State “is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concludes 
that the possibilities of reaching agreement have been exhausted”.
269
 Furthermore, 
irrespective of the other applicable provisions the States remain free to agree at any time on 
settling a dispute by peaceful means of their own choosing.
270
 Should States fail to settle their 
dispute through these discretionary means, their dispute shall be submitted to a court or 
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The compulsory dispute settlement procedures, however, are subject to section 3 of Part XV 
UNCLOS, which is crucial for fisheries disputes and, as such, CMR-related due to the wide 
jurisdictional limitations therein.
272
 Notably, section 2 of Part XV is not applicable to disputes 
concerning (1) the sovereign rights of a coastal State relating to living resources in the EEZ 
and (2) the exercise of these sovereign rights such as determining allowable catch, harvesting 
capacity, surpluses allocation to other States, and the requirements in the conservation and 
management measures.
273
 Further limitation may be applied with respect to disputes dealing 
with law enforcement activities in regard to these sovereign rights.
274
 These wide 
jurisdictional limitations render the available compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms of 
very limited use for CMR disputes.  
 
These limitations were put in place to explicitly reflect the intention of the States parties 
during the UNCLOS negotiations. They wanted to exclude compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanisms where negotiations for conservation and management measures reach impasse 
and the relevant States cannot reach an agreement.
275
 The jurisdictional limitations would 
apply equally to deadlocks during renegotiations in a CMR context. The relevant States are 
neither obliged to negotiate ad infinitum until they reach an agreement, nor are particular 
consequences spelled out should the negotiations fail.
276
 This is because the regime only 





This was a conscious choice and it was a clear move away from the 1958 Fisheries 
Convention. Articles 4 to 7 of the 1958 Fisheries Convention provided that, after failing to 
reach an agreement within a year of negotiating the necessary conservation measures, any of 
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the relevant States may initiate a dispute settlement procedure entailing a binding decision. 
The 1958 Fisheries Convention also included a provision that would have addressed a CMR 
dispute very well. Article 12 stated that where the factual basis on which the binding decision 
was based is “altered by substantial changes in the conditions of the stock or stocks of fish or 
other living marine resources” any of the relevant States may request the other relevant States 
to “enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement the necessary 
modifications in the measures of conservation”. This is essentially the renegotiation 
obligation discussed in section III above but put in terms of a dispute settlement mechanism. 
There was also a de minimis rule included in the qualification ‘substantial’. Such de minimis 
rule was unfoundedly echoed in the recitals of Regulation 793/2013, as already observed. 
Article 12 also provided that where an agreement was not reached within a reasonable period 
of time the same dispute settlement mechanism could be used again, provided that two years 
have passed since the original decision. Unfortunately, Article 12 did not find its way to the 
existing regime today in such a clear form.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations and the conduct-oriented nature of the negotiation 
obligations, there is a way in which the compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms can be 
used for a CMR dispute. This is where the dispute concerns the issue whether the due 
diligence and good faith obligations were respected during the required negotiations.
278
 Such 
a dispute falls outside of the jurisdictional limitations and can be subjected to the compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the existing regime, which do entail a binding decision. The 
two main problems in such proceedings are (1) the burden of proof and (2) the available 
remedies.  
 
With respect to the burden of proof, the Tacna-Arica case
279
 is indicative. There the 
arbitration dealt with inter alia the issue of bad faith in negotiations that were prescribed by a 
bilateral treaty and which proved unsuccessful. The award stated that, for bad faith, intent 
must be found “to frustrate the carrying out of the provisions”, which is not “simply the 
refusal of a particular agreement proposed thereunder, because of its terms, but the purpose to 
prevent any reasonable agreement”.
 280
 While finding bad faith, if established, should not be a 
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hesitation, “it is plain that such a purpose should not be lightly imputed”
281
 especially when it 
comes to States. The award concluded on this issue by saying that a finding of bad faith 
“should be supported not by disputable inferences but by clear and convincing evidence 
which compels such a conclusion”.
282
 With respect to the available remedies, even if a court 
or tribunal finds bad faith, considering the jurisdictional limitations, the remedy could not go 
further than a declaratory judgment.
283
 That is, the seized court or tribunal will not have the 
power to make TAC allocations or otherwise prescribe conservation measures as a remedy 
without the consent of the parties to the dispute. 
 
The existing regime provides another possible solution with respect to disputes dealing with 
coastal State rights and duties within the EEZ. This is the compulsory conciliation 
commission under Annex V UNCLOS,
284
 which can be used in a CMR dispute, without, 
however, entailing a binding decision.
285
 It is a solution in case States fail to resolve their 
dispute by the peaceful means they have chosen and it can be used for very specific CMR 
disputes. Such proceedings may be initiated only where it is alleged that a coastal State has (1) 
manifestly failed to ensure that living resources are not endangered in its EEZ; (2) arbitrarily 
refused to determine allowable catch and harvesting capacity; and (3) arbitrarily refused to 




The first mechanism could be used where a CMR must be addressed from the conservationist 
perspective and a coastal State fails to act accordingly. The other two mechanisms are closely 
connected as they deal with the access of States to the surplus within the EEZ of a particular 
coastal State and can be discussed together. Usually, in the case of a CMR a new coastal State 
for a particular shared stock would argue to be recognised as such by the old coastal States 
and could potentially face resistance from them, as it was the case with Iceland and Greenland 
for mackerel. However, it could theoretically happen that a CMR leads to such redistribution 
in the zonal attachment of a shared stock that there is an overwhelming abundance of the 
stock within the EEZ of a new or one of the old coastal States to the abrupt and heavy 
detriment of the other relevant States. Then, in order to continue with their fishing activities, 
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the other relevant States would be highly interested to fish in that coastal State’s EEZ. 
Furthermore, the coastal State must determine the surplus, if any, and allocate it in accordance 
with the relevant UNCLOS provisions. However, if the coastal State is inactive in doing so 
and arbitrarily refuses to do it, even after being requested by the other relevant States, the 
conciliation proceedings can be used. Being that as it may, even if this commission is used it 
cannot “substitute its discretion for that of the coastal State”,
287
 which includes the 




Accordingly, once a coastal State adopts measures concerning the living resources within its 
EEZ, these measures may not be subject to external review involving binding decision 
without its consent.
289
 In cases of disputes about shared fish stocks only the part of the dispute 
concerning the high seas may be submitted to compulsory settlement, which is of little use 
considering its incomprehensiveness.
290
 The CMR disputes that involve a high-seas aspect 
can also develop in the context of RFMOs and/or stock-specific treaties having their own 
dispute settlement mechanisms. These will be discussed in the sub-section on external 
agreements. 
 
Since the UNCLOS and the UNFSA are to be read together as if they were a single instrument, 
with priority given to the UNCLOS, it was only logical that they were also governed by more 
or less the same dispute settlement rules.
291
 This was done in Part VIII with Article 30(2) 
UNFSA, which states that the Part XV UNCLOS provisions apply mutatis mutandis to 
disputes on the interpretation and application of the UNFSA, even without the parties to the 
dispute necessarily being parties to the UNCLOS. However, the UNCLOS jurisdictional 
limitations on fisheries are also incorporated through Article 32 UNFSA rendering the 
mechanisms therein of limited use, unless the dispute is on high seas measures.
292
 The CMR-
related disputes may concern a great number of UNFSA provisions due to its specialised 
subject-matter. The attention here will be focused only on two issues due to their prominence 
in the Mackerel dispute.  
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The first one concerns the disputes on the compatibility of the conservation measures in the 
EEZ and on the high seas, under Article 7 UNFSA. Where States fail to agree, they are 
referred to dispute settlement mechanisms in Part VIII UNFSA. While negotiating, the States 
are also to make every effort to enter into practical provisional arrangements. In the event of 
failing to agree to such arrangements, the UNFSA redirects them again to Part VIII in order to 
obtain provisional measures from the seized court or tribunal. However, considering the 
applicable jurisdictional limitations, these prima facie compulsory dispute settlement 
procedures cannot lead to a decision specifying measures applicable within the EEZ of a 
relevant party without its consent.
293
 In the Mackerel dispute such a problem appeared when 
the quota-increases of the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, on the one hand, and the lack 
of balancing decreases by the other relevant States, for both the EEZ and the high seas, on the 
other hand, seemingly led to an incompatibility of the measures and the consequent 
suspension of the MSC certificate. However, Article 7 UNFSA procedures were not initiated. 
 
The second CMR issue concerns disputes relating to the inclusion of States in already 
established RFMOs or arrangements for the conservation and management of a particular 
shared stock. In this regard the UNFSA provisions on ‘real interest’ are of relevance, since 
States with real interest must not be excluded from the negotiations on conservation measures 
by the other relevant States. Put in terms of a CMR, such a dispute could happen in a situation 
where a State, in the EEZ of which a particular shared stock has just entered, wants to join the 
establishment of or the already established RFMO or arrangement and is excluded by the 
other States. Such disputes cannot be initiated against the RFMO in question, if there is one, 
because RFMOs do not have standing under neither the UNCLOS nor the UNFSA dispute 
settlement mechanisms.
294
 It would also be impossible to use the RFMO’s mechanism, if it is 
available, where the complaining State is a non-member.
295
 The only available option is to 
initiate proceedings against the actual member States of the RFMO, under UNFSA for the 
violation of Article 8 or under the UNCLOS for failing to cooperate or to have due regard to 
the rights and duties of other States.
296
 This may raise concerns of attributability but this issue 
will not be further examined here. 
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In the Mackerel dispute, the issue of participation/inclusion in an RFMO did not arise because 
all of the States involved were members of the NEAF Organisation. The issue there was 
rather with the participation in the negotiations of the measures applicable within the EEZ of 
the coastal States. Particularly, there were such problems with the participation of Greenland 
in the arrangements for mackerel and herring. However, no steps were taken with respect to a 
dispute settlement on that point either.  
 
The CMR-related disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the regime, 
playing the important role that they do, are complemented by another type of more 
circumstance-oriented disputes, which is probably just as important, if not more. The CMR-
related disputes, being, essentially, fisheries disputes, have two crucial characteristics –
scientific and technical issues in such disputes as well as fact-finding. The importance of these 
characteristics was recognised in the 1958 Fisheries Convention and was further developed in 
the UNCLOS and the UNFSA. Since the CMRs are instances of changing ocean realities, 
fact-finding as well as scientific and technical matters play a very important role in resolving 
the relevant disputes. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the solutions the regime 
provides for such disputes as well.  
 
The points of contention with respect to facts and scientific and technical matters can vary 
widely due to, on the one hand, the different ocean realities around the world and, on the other 
hand, the different constellations in which a CMR can occur. Such points of contention can 
deal with whether a CMR has actually occurred, what kind of CMR is it, is it temporary or not, 
does it affect associated species, etc. These and other such questions, when answered can go a 
long way in helping the relevant States solve their disputes. The drafters, thoughtfully, 
provided a tool in Article 287(1)(d) UNCLOS, albeit not compulsory, to the relevant States 
for solving such issues. This provision gives the choice of using “a special arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VIII” UNCLOS.  
 
The mechanisms provided therein are subject-matter-oriented and include, explicitly, disputes 
with respect to fisheries.
297
 They are also subject to the general UNCLOS dispute settlement 
provisions and their fisheries-related exceptions.
298
. While the Annex VIII special tribunal 
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generally can also decide on disputes concerning the interpretation and application of 
UNCLOS provisions, its importance lies in the fact that the tribunal is to be composed 
primarily by experts from the particular field (from the FAO in case of fisheries)
299
 and the 
possibility that the parties to a fisheries dispute may request the tribunal to solve disputes 
mainly concerning facts.
300
 The tribunal could make conclusive finding of fact as between the 
parties, unless they agree otherwise
301
 and, if so requested, it may also formulate non-binding 





Another related provision that can assist the relevant States in resolving their CMR dispute is 
Article 289 UNCLOS. According to it,  
 
“In any dispute involving scientific or technical matters, a court or 
tribunal exercising jurisdiction under this section may, at the request 
of a party or proprio motu, select in consultation with the parties no 
fewer than two scientific or technical experts chosen preferably from 
the relevant list prepared in accordance with Annex VIII, article 2, to 
sit with the court or tribunal but without the right to vote.” 
 
This provision gives the other necessary tools that may be missing from Annex VIII for 
dealing with issues requiring specific expertise in CMR disputes, where a court or tribunal has 
jurisdiction to decide them. Further choice is given to the relevant States by Article 29 
UNFSA, which provides that 
 
“Where a dispute concerns a matter of a technical nature, the States 
concerned may refer the dispute to an ad hoc expert panel established 
by them. The panel shall confer with the States concerned and shall 
endeavour to resolve the dispute expeditiously without recourse to 
binding procedures for the settlement of disputes.” 
 
All of these provisions and possibilities for dispute settlement, however, are not compulsory 
but are optional, which can negate the central role that they can play for resolving CMR 
disputes.  
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In the Mackerel dispute, the dispute settlement mechanisms in the existing regime were used 
to a certain extent. Under the existing regime, the Faroe Islands and the EU had a CMR 
dispute on the interpretation and application of a number of provisions from the existing 
regime,
303
 as it appears from the exchanges they had. In Regulation 793/2013, with which the 
EU imposed sanctions against the Faroes, the EU considered that the Faroe Islands failed to 
cooperate and as such breached its obligations under Articles 61(2), 63(1) and (2), 118, 119 
and 300 UNCLOS and Articles 5, 6, 8(1) and (2) UNFSA.
304
 The inclusion of Article 300 
UNCLOS means that the EU considered the Faroe Islands to have also breached its obligation 
to comply with its obligations in good faith and not to exercise its rights and jurisdiction in a 
way constituting abuse of right. This means that one of the contention points under this CMR 
dispute fell outside of the jurisdictional limitations and the EU could have initiated 
compulsory dispute settlement proceedings entailing binding decision under Part XV, section 
2 UNCLOS. However, the EU did not use this opportunity, probably because inter alia it 




In response to the threat of measures the Faroe Islands stated that if the EU proceeds “with the 
adoption and implementation of the contemplated measures, [it] would consider consultations 
under section 1 of Part XV of UNCLOS, as further reflected in [the fisheries treaty between 
them], as being exhausted, given the impossibility of continuing meaningful negotiations 
under such circumstances.”
306
 The Faroes continued by saying that it reserves “the right to 
take necessary measures to instigate appropriate compulsory conciliation proceedings”
307
 
(emphasis added). This suggested that the Faroes may have been considering the compulsory 
proceedings that do not entail a binding decision. However, the Faroe Islands eventually 
initiated proceedings that do entail a binding decision under Annex VII UNCLOS. In 
particular, the Faroe Islands, interestingly, initiated proceedings with regard to a dispute over 
the interpretation and application of only Article 63(1) UNCLOS concerning herring.
308
 As 
the Faroe Islands and the EU resolved their dispute the proceedings were eventually 
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terminated by a joint request, which was “without prejudice to the rights and duties of either 





2.2 External agreements 
 
In order to accommodate the multitude of views and interests with respect to the dispute 
settlement mechanisms applicable to the LOS, the UNCLOS was drafted in such a way as to 
allow for a high degree of flexibility. This flexibility includes dynamic interplay with 
instruments external to the regime, as long as disputes are resolved in a peaceful manner. This 
interplay involves instances of ‘outsourcing’ as well ‘insourcing’ of dispute settlement. The 
outsourcing part has spurred many debates and has attracted criticisms relating to 
fragmentation of international law, forum-shopping and conflicting decisions. One need only 
think in that regard of the Southern Bluefin Tuna
310
 and the MOX Plant
311
 cases, before the 
Annex VII Tribunals. While neither of them were CMR disputes, the issues of dispute 
settlement and jurisdiction that were raised in them can equally apply to a CMR dispute and, 
thus, a brief recollection of the main points is needed.  
 
The Southern Bluefin Tuna case concerned, mainly, Article 281 UNCLOS and the conditions 
under which States may exclude the dispute settlement mechanisms in the UNCLOS. The 
arbitral tribunal considered that, due to the existence of a dispute settlement mechanism in the 
trilateral Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),
312
 it lacked 
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the dispute, which dealt directly with the duty to 
cooperate.
313
 The tribunal read the relevant CCSBT clause as excluding the UNCLOS 
compulsory mechanisms, even though the CCSBT clause provided neither for a compulsory 
procedure entailing a binding decision, nor did it explicitly exclude the compulsory UNCLOS 
mechanisms. The conclusion that States may exclude the compulsory UNCLOS mechanisms 
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through agreement pursuant to Article 281(1) UNCLOS,
314
 even if it does not contain 
compulsory procedures for dispute settlement, spurred many discussions on the effectiveness 
of the UNCLOS compulsory procedures.
315
 Since shared stocks are to be conserved and 
managed mainly through RFMOs or direct agreements, the decision in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna case will weigh heavily in CMR disputes, if these agreements have some sort of dispute 
settlement procedures.  
 
The MOX Plant cases before the ITLOS (2001) and the Annex VII tribunal (2003) are 
relevant here for their discussions of Article 282 UNCLOS, which allows for dispute 
settlement mechanisms in “general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise” to supersede 
the mechanisms in the UNCLOS, if the mechanism “entails a binding decision”. The UK 
argued before the ITLOS that the main issues to be decided by the Annex VII tribunal were 
excluded from its jurisdiction because they were governed by other agreements with 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures – the OSPAR Convention, the TEC, or the 
Euratom Treaty.
316
 While the ITLOS gave ‘a green light’ for the dispute,
317
 the Annex VII 
tribunal decided that the jurisdictional question depended on whether the UNCLOS 
interpretation as between Ireland and the UK fell within ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction.
318
 Thus, 
the tribunal suspended the procedures in anticipation of ECJ’s decision, which firmly asserted 
its jurisdiction on this point.  
 
These two outsourcing possibilities in Articles 281 and 282 UNCLOS put very few 
constraints on States in choosing the institutional setting for solving their dispute. A much 
more constrained form of outsourcing is present in Article 287 UNCLOS where several forum 
choices, including the ICJ, are given to the States, but which would apply the UNCLOS 
procedural rules. The concurrence of forum choices is made a necessary requirement in 
Article 287 UNCLOS. Absent such concurrence, the Annex VII Tribunal is the default 
solution, which was also used in the Mackerel dispute. 
 
The mutual agreement between the parties to the dispute is equally important for insourcing, 
that is, where the UNCLOS mechanism is to be used to settle disputes arising from external 
                                                 
314
 Ibid., [63]. 
315
 Y Tanaka, supra, n 267, 422. 
316
 Ibid., 423. 
317
 Case No 10, ITLOS, supra, n 150, [62]. 
318
 The MOX Plant Case, supra, n 312, 2. 




agreements, setting the UNFSA aside. This is regulated by Article 288(2) UNCLOS. It allows 
for such external, yet “related to the purposes of [the UNCLOS]”, agreements to be included 
in the jurisdiction of the relevant court or tribunal under Article 287 UNCLOS, as the ITLOS 
Advisory Opinion confirmed. Such inclusion, however, is to happen in accordance with the 
respective international agreement. This dispute settlement opportunity could be relevant for 
CMR disputes arising in the contexts of bilateral, multilateral or RFMO-constituting treaties. 
Even then, however, unless otherwise agreed in such treaties, the UNCLOS jurisdictional 
limitations with respect to fisheries would equally apply. 
In the Mackerel dispute there was one relevant external binding agreement – the NEAF 
Convention. However, it does not contain a dispute settlement mechanism. In 2003 the EU 
proposed an amendment to the NEAF Convention with respect to dispute settlement together 
with two recommendations concerning dispute settlement procedures,
319
 which were to be 
applied once the amendment entered into force.
320
 The proposed amendment was to take the 
form of Article 18bis and provided that “the [NEAFC] shall make recommendations 
establishing procedures for the settlement of disputes arising under [the NEAF] Convention”. 
Although the amendment was adopted in 2004, it has not yet entered into force, due to 
Russia’s subsequent objection.
321
 While the EU suggested that the amendment is applied 
provisionally until it enters into force,
322
 it seems that this has not been done, considering that 
the Declaration on Interpretation of the NEAF Convention only notes the 2006 amendments 
but not the 2004 ones.
323
 Furthermore, to the best of this author’s knowledge, at no point 






3. Self-help measures 
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As it can be seen, the UNCLOS dispute settlement provisions contain many and wide 
jurisdictional limitations for disputes concerning EEZ fisheries and, by the same token, for 
CMR disputes, which are tightly connected to EEZ measures. For this reason and due to the 
very long and time consuming nature of such disputes, the relevant States may be inclined to 
consider self-help measures in order to protect their interests in contentious situations of 
unsuccessful cooperation, as in the Mackerel dispute.  
 
In broad terms, the defining objective of such CMR-related self-help measures can be said to 
be the dissuasion of a particular State from adopting and implementing measures that are 
affecting the conservation and management of a shared stock and that are considered, by the 
State adopting the self-help measures, to have negative effect on the stock. The State may be 
dissuaded through measures adopted against it directly or against vessels flying its flag. The 
measures can be specific or broad. They can be specific when they aim at enforcing or 
otherwise ensuring compliance with conservation measures for the particular shared stock. 
Conversely, they can be broad to target other (unrelated) stocks or even include other non-
conservation issues such as suspension of bilateral agreements, etc. The conservation 
measures being enforced can be of national or of RFMO origin and the enforcement may take 
place on the high seas, within the EEZ or at port. Although these measures can vary quite 
widely, they can generally be put in three categories of compulsion available to states under 
general international law.
325
 These categories are retorsion (retaliation), countermeasure and 
self-defence. Connected to these are also the circumstances precluding wrongfulness, with 




The various self-help measures also seem to be considered as alternative to dispute settlement 
and not as a measure of last resort, at least this was the case in the Mackerel dispute. There, 
during the Commission consultations that led to Regulation 1026/2012, the target groups 
suggested the use of the ITLOS mechanism – an option that was not even considered by the 
EU before that.
327
 This option was quickly rejected because it was considered that it was “too 
lengthy and [did] not respond to the imperatives of short-term risk of overfishing”.
328
 The 
unilateral character of such measures is in direct contrast with the cooperative character of the 
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existing regime. For this reason they must not be taken lightly and must be heavily scrutinised. 
The discussion here will start with the self-help measures that States can adopt under the 






3.1 Under the existing regime    
 
Considering the wide variety of possible measures, the next step in discussing the self-help 
measures is to examine to what extent they can be supported by the existing regime. Here, 
again, the existing regime provides for comparatively less options than the 1958 Fisheries 
Convention. In the 1958 Convention, the special interest of the coastal State in shared stocks 
in the waters adjacent to its national jurisdiction was recognised and the coastal State was 
given the authority to adopt measures extending unto the high seas in certain situations.
329
 By 
contrast, the UNCLOS does not, generally, recognise a special interest for straddling stocks, 
save for special cases such as the anadromous species.
330
 Furthermore, the UNCLOS does not 
provide a basis for extending jurisdiction on the high seas over vessels flying foreign flags 





The only self-help measures that could possibly be of use in CMR situations and in 
accordance with the UNCLOS are (1) limiting the access of foreign fishing vessels within the 
home EEZ and (2) limiting the access of vessels flying the home flag to the EEZ of the 
relevant State. The effect of these measures will not be equal in all situations because they 
greatly depend on the factual circumstances of the CMR. Limiting access to the home EEZ 
will only be effective where this EEZ contains fishing grounds that provide comparatively 
much more efficient fishing opportunities. Limiting the access of home vessels to a foreign 
EEZ can be effective where a CMR involves the EEZ of a new State, the fishing industry of 
which lacks the technical capacity to exploit the newly arrived stock and, as such, this State 
depends on foreign fishing fleets. Similar situation happened with Greenland during the 
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Mackerel dispute. Norway was aware of the appetites of Greenland towards EU’s fishing fleet 
for its exploratory fishing of mackerel. In order to exert pressure, Norway negotiated a clause 
in the mackerel deal with the EU and the Faroe Islands from 2014 that was severely limiting 
the access of the vessels of the parties to the agreement to fishing mackerel in the waters of a 
third State. This clause has been interpreted to be indirectly aimed at Greenland. 
 
The UNCLOS self-help measures were further developed in the UNFSA through the 
provisions in its Part VI, which regulates the compliance and enforcement measures. While 
the UNFSA does not provide for any enforcement measures with respect to the fishing 
activities of foreign vessels in their home EEZ, it does allow in Article 21 for certain 
enforcement measures against fishing activities on the high seas. In particular, Article 21 
allows enforcement action against violations of RFMO measures/arrangements on the high 
seas.
332
 The enforcement action can be taken by a member of the RFMO/arrangement and can 
be even against a non-member as long as both States are parties to the UNFSA. The 
enforcement is to happen through boarding inspections at sea with the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with the applicable measures.
333
 Article 21 UNFSA distinguishes between serious 
and non-serious violations (by the vessel and its crew) and prescribes different consequences 
for both types, when registered during the inspection. With non-serious violations, the flag 
State is the one responsible for imposing sanctions, which makes them unfit for self-help 
measures. For serious violations, in case the flag State fails to respond or to take necessary 
action, the inspectors can remain on board and secure evidence and even require the master to 
bring the vessel to port.
334
 Article 21(11) UNFSA provide for a list of situations amounting to 
serious violations, which can be extended by a relevant RFMO/arrangement. In the case of a 
CMR, serious violations are relevant where a vessel fishes without or after the attainment of a 
quota established by the relevant RFMO/arrangement.   
 
Article 23 UNFSA also provides for the possibility of reaction through port State measures. It 
empowers a port State to promote the effectiveness of applicable conservation measures in 
accordance with international law. Article 23(2) UNFSA allows for inspections of documents, 
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fishing gear and on-board catches when the vessels are voluntarily in port. For situations 
where it is established that the catch was taken in a manner undermining the effectiveness of 
the applicable measures, the national authorities may be empowered to prohibit landings and 
transhipments. Article 23 UNFSA served as basis for the development of the international 
IUU regime, for which the EU also has a Regulation in place but did not use in the Mackerel 
dispute due to its inapplicability, as already explained in section II. 
Accordingly, the existence of an RFMO measure or an arrangement is central to the discussed 
compliance and enforcement measures under Articles 21 and 23 UNFSA. In a CMR case this 
will be crucial. Where all of the relevant States in a CMR situation are also members of the 
particular RFMO or arrangement, due to the usually available option of objections, measures 
will often not get adopted or if they do, they will not be binding on the objecting party. In 
such case the self-help provisions will prove useless.  
 
The Mackerel dispute showed that objections in such cases are not purely theoretical, as the 
Faroe Islands objected to the NEAFC recommendations on herring for 2013 and 2014. 
Circumvention of the RFMO procedure through direct arrangements is not possible once an 
RFMO is established and is given competence within that geographical area. Reference point 
here is the 2014 trilateral mackerel deal. While the NEAFC did not adopt a recommendation 
on mackerel for 2014, the trilateral arrangement between the EU, Norway and the Faroe 
Islands explicitly mentioned the NEAFC and left a certain quota allocated to it.
335
 The 
arrangement relating to the NEAFC area could not have the legal force of an actual NEAFC 
measure. This is because, first, the arrangement was not binding and, second, because it was 
made outside of the NEAFC framework and, as such, it is a res inter alios acta not only 
towards the other fishing parties but also towards the NEAFC itself. Therefore, it could not 
have been used as a basis for measures under Articles 21 and 23 UNFSA. Consequently, the 
self-help provisions of the UNFSA can only prove useful where a CMR involves a new State 
that is not a member of the particular RFMO or arrangement and its members are unwilling to 
recognise that State’s real interest in the fishery and do not admit it as a member. In such case 
once a measure is adopted its members can enforce it against the new entrant in the fishery 
through inspections and port State measures outside of the new entrant’s EEZ.  
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In light of this overview of the possible self-help measures under the existing regime, it is 
necessary to examine to what extent the measures used in the Mackerel dispute can be based 
on the existing regime. The first measure that the EU took against the Faroe Islands, separate 
from Regulation 793/2013, was to deny access of Faroese vessels to the fishing grounds 
within the EU’s EEZ. This EU measure fell squarely in the existing regime. This is a measure 
that could easily be undeservedly overlooked because it is a rather passive one. While, usually, 
the negotiations on the conservation and management measures involve TAC, quota 
allocations and EEZ access, as a package-deal, these three are separate issues and there could 
be an agreement on some and lack of agreement on the others. This is exemplified by the 
result of the 2014 mackerel deal, after which Faroese vessels were once again allowed to fish 
mackerel within the EU’s EEZ while there was still no agreement on herring and, thus, the 
sanctions still applied to the mackerel caught in Faroese waters. 
 
Regulation 793/2012 was the more visible instrument containing a collection of self-help 
measures. In Article 5 thereof, the EU prohibited (1) the introduction in the EU, including 
transhipment at EU ports, of mackerel and herring as well as resulting fishery products and (2) 
the use of the EU ports by Faroese vessels or vessels authorised by the Faroes that fished 
and/or transported mackerel and herring or their resulting fishery products. The first measure 
is essentially an import ban, while the second is a port State measure.
336
 Both of these 
measures were, therefore, to be enforced at the EU borders and not at sea. The prohibitions 
introduced by Regulation 793/2013 had very wide scopes ratione loci and ratione personae. 
Ratione loci, they could include both the high seas and the EEZ. With respect to the EEZ, 
they could include every EEZ in which a vessel ‘under the control of the Faroe Islands’ fished 
herring and mackerel, not only the Faroese one.
337
 Ratione personae they could also be very 
wide to include vessels flying the flag of any other State that were chartered by a Faroese firm 
or the Faroese authorities or that have been authorised to fish within the Faroes’ EEZ. While 
the scope ratione personae could include vessels flying the EU flag and be in full compliance 
with the existing regime, it is much wider.  
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The import ban measure clearly fell outside of the existing regime as the trade in fish and fish 
products is not regulated by it but by WTO law. The port State measure could have been 
justified to certain extent
338
 under the existing framework, if they were enforcing an RFMO 
measure. However, there was no binding NEAFC measure to be enforced. The recitals of 
Regulation 793/2013 referred to arrangements from 2007 which, however, were not binding. 
As such, Regulation 793/2013 did not refer to any binding conservation measures for the high 
seas, which it was to enforce. It also did not refer to any other separate basis in the existing 
regime for the measures it prescribed against the Faroe Islands. Accordingly, the EU measures 
in the Mackerel dispute, in totality, were only partially covered by the existing regime. 
Consequently, in order to be in compliance with international law they must be legally based 
beyond the existing framework.  
 
 
3.2 Beyond the existing regime 
 
Beyond the existing regime, the self-help measures that can be used can be governed by the 
law on state responsibility or by more specialised treaty regimes, such as WTO law. The 
discussion here will examine only the main available self-help tool and their application in 
CMR situations without going in detail in these regimes as it goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The categories of self-help measures that were identified above have one important 
dividing feature – the original legality of the measure. Where the measures itself constitutes 
an illegal act, that is, breach of international law, it will be dealt with by the customary law on 
state responsibility, to the extent that no lex specialis rules are applicable. The discussion will 
begin with the lawful self-help measures. 
 
Retaliation measures are unfriendly and harmful lawful acts and can be adopted as retaliation 
against harmful acts of another State, which can be both lawful and unlawful.
339
 Such 
measures are a way of expressing serious discontent with the conduct of another State by 
hurting that State, while staying within the boundaries of legality.
340
 The retaliation measures 
can be lawful under customary international law and can include, for example, severance of 
diplomatic relations. They can also be lawful under treaty law, that is, be based on rights to 
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take certain measures provided in particular treaty provisions. Such are the self-help measures 
that are available under the UNCLOS and the UNFSA and some of which the EU used.   
 
However, the self-help measures in the context of a CMR, as the Mackerel dispute showed, 
can involve economic restrictions, which are not covered by the LOS regime. In particular, in 
cases of disagreement on applicable conservation and management measures States are 
inclined to adopt trade retaliation measures with various degrees of success.
341
 In such cases 
for the measures to be considered retaliation they must respect the relevant economic and 
trade agreements. At the global level, for most States, WTO law would be the specialised 
trade regime that must be observed.
342
 At the regional level, in the different parts of the world, 
there would usually be different bilateral or multilateral economic and trade agreements, 
which must be observed. The EU was well aware of that and the Legal Service of the 
Commission was, thus, asked to give its opinion on whether the measures the EU envisioned 
for the Faroe Islands and Iceland could be justified under WTO law as well as the EEA 




Even where the measures in question constitute illegal acts, they can be considered in 
compliance with international law if there are circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of 
these measures. If such circumstances exist, the international responsibility of the State 
adopting these measures will not be involved. There are six main circumstances considered to 
be applicable under general international law.
344
 These are consent, countermeasures, self-
defence, force majeure, distress and necessity.
345
 In the context of self-help measures, adopted 
in a CMR-related disagreement, these circumstances have varying degrees of relevance. 
These rules on state responsibility apply as a default regime and special regimes (lex specialis) 




 Such special regime can be the WTO regime, 
which provides for rules regulating the consequences for WTO law breaches. The discussion 
below, however, will not venture into the WTO regime. 
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The consent circumstance, as its name goes, requires that the State, which would otherwise be 
injured by the particular act, has given its consent and, thus, wrongfulness is precluded. This 
circumstance has no relevance for CMR self-help measures due to the context in which they 
arise. Countermeasures, however, are crucial. For countermeasures to be justifiable, they must 
meet several conditions.
348
 First, the countermeasure must be taken against a State that has 
breached an obligation it owed to the State taking the countermeasure. Second, before taking 
the countermeasure, the target State must be called upon to discontinue its wrongful conduct 
and to provide reparations. Furthermore, notification is to be given of planned 
countermeasures, while offering the opportunity of negotiations.
349
 Where the international 
wrongful act has ceased and the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal with jurisdiction 
to take binding decisions, countermeasures must not be taken or, if taken, must be 
suspended.
350
 Third, the countermeasure must be commensurate to the injury initially suffered, 
taking into account the nature of the wrongful conduct and the rights in question.
351
 In that 
regard countermeasures must not breach obligations such as threat of use of force, human 
rights, jus cogens or obligations of humanitarian character.
352
 Fourth, countermeasures must 
be terminated when the wrongful act ceases and must, as far as possible, be taken in a way not 
preventing the resumption of performance of the obligation, which was temporarily stopped.  
 
Countermeasures can be very relevant for self-help measures in a CMR context, as the 
preparatory works of Regulation 1026/2012 show, where it was one of the main options 
considered. However, as it will be shown below, the Legal Service of the Commission found 
it an unadvisable option for the EU. Still, if one looks closely at the provisions of Regulation 
1026/2012, one can see a very good match between the conditions for countermeasures and 
the way in which the implementing coercive measures are to be adopted.  
 
The circumstance of self-defence can have little relevance in the context of CMR self-help 
measures because they are taken in response of certain fisheries policy, which is not per se an 
                                                 
348
 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Reports 7, [55]-[57]. See also R 
Rayfuse, ‘Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement’ (2004) 51 NILR 41. 
349




 US-France Air Services Agreement Arbitration 54 ILR 303, 307. 
352
 See Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim 17, 1 July 2003, 
[159]. 
CONSEQUENCES OF UNSUCCESSFUL COOPERATION 95 
 
 
“overwhelming danger to an actual and essential right of a State”.
353
 Furthermore, resorting to 
force in self-defence requires proof that the State exercising self-defence was a victim of an 
armed attack.
354
 Admittedly, certain fisheries disputes may progressively escalate to the point 
where complaints of threat of use of force appear
355
 as well as instances of actual use of 
force.
356
 In the Mackerel dispute, the one instance where physical compulsion was used was 
in 2010 when a Faroese vessel was blocked from entering harbour in Aberdeen and offloading 
its mackerel catch. This was privately organised by the fishermen and, while incurring 
economic losses for the trawler operator, does not amount to use of force. Therefore, self-
defence could in very rare situations only be used in a CMR dispute. 
 
Force majeure, distress and necessity are, arguably, even more exceptional circumstances 
than self-defence and could be relied on to preclude the wrongfulness of certain self-help 
measures in a CMR context in even more rare situations. In the Rainbow Warrior arbitration 
the tribunal stressed that the force majeure doctrine was one of “absolute and material 
impossibility”.
357
 Thus, “circumstance  rendering  performance  more  difficult  or  
burdensome  does not  constitute  a  case of force majeure”.
358
 One can hardly imagine self-
help measures in a CMR context that can be covered by this doctrine. Similar is the case with 
the circumstance of distress where it is required that “the author  of  the  act  in  question  has 
no  other  reasonable  way,  in  a  situation  of  distress,  of saving  the  author’s  life  or  the  
lives  of  other  persons entrusted to the author’s care”.
359
 While cases of distress would 
usually involve ships and aircrafts, they refer to single isolated instances connected to bad 
weather conditions and cannot, therefore be relied to preclude the wrongfulness of a policy 
choice of self-help measures against the fishing practices of another State.  
 
Finally, the circumstance of necessity, which is equally to be accepted “on an exceptional 
basis”,
360
 may have some relevance here. For necessity to be invoked by a State, its act must 
be the only way for it “to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril” 
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and the act must not “seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole”.
361
 Necessity has 
been invoked in a number of different situations by States. Probably, the most relevant here is 
the Turbot War and the reliance on necessity by Canada, which, however, was not ruled on by 
the ICJ, due to lack of jurisdiction.
362
 In 1994 Canada declared the straddling stocks of the 
Grand Banks to be “threatened with extinction” and, consequently, Canada had to “take 
urgent action necessary to prevent further destruction of those stocks and to permit their 
rebuilding”.
363
 The subsequent arrest of the Spanish vessel Estai was in the view of Canada 
“necessary in order to put a stop to the overfishing of Greenland halibut by Spanish 
fishermen”.
364
 If this is considered a rightful reliance on necessity as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness, it could be applied in CMR situations where the particular shared 
stock is in very dire situation due to the fishing activities of the State against which the 
measures are adopted. 
 
The EU Regulations that were adopted with respect to the Mackerel dispute were neither 
based on the UNCLOS nor on the UNFSA, although they were said to be in pursuance of 
their cooperation provisions. In particular, Regulation 1026/2012 states in its second recital 
that, where third States, which are interested in the fishery of a shared stock, allow 
unsustainable fishing and fail to cooperate with the other relevant States, “specific measures 
should be adopted in order to encourage that country to contribute to the conservation of that 
stock”. In the fifth recital it is stated that the measures are to be designed in such a way so that 
they are, inter alia, compatible with international and, specifically, with WTO law. As such, 
the EU decided to use tools outside of the existing regime in order to contribute to the 
effectiveness of this regime by ‘encouraging cooperation’. However, from the very broadly 
drafted recitals it does not become clear what kind of self-help measures the EU envisions – 
retaliation or countermeasures or something else. A closer look is thus needed.  
 
Regulation 1026/2012, being simply a framework for adopting measures, cannot be said to be 
any kind of self-help measure on its own. What can be said, though, is that Regulation 
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1026/2012 does not rule out anything, as long as it will achieve the aim of encouraging 
cooperation and is in compliance with international law. This can be read to include 
countermeasures because if they are lawful they preclude wrongfulness and are, as such, in 
more general sense in compliance with international law. The EU paid special attention on the 
issue of countermeasures during the drafting of Regulation 1026/2012 and whether and how 
they can be used. The Legal Service of the Commission was explicitly asked “whether the 





The Legal Service expressed considerable doubts as to the need for resorting to 
countermeasures as well as whether a breach of an obligation owed to the EU can be 
established, considering the EU’s complaints of States that only “fail to cooperate” or take 
“extreme negotiating positions”.
366
 With respect to the need for resorting to countermeasures, 
the Legal Service stated that the desired import restrictions were permitted under certain 
conditions by the relevant WTO, EEA and bilateral agreements.
367
 Thus, countermeasures 
were seen as redundant in light of the express intent of the EU, at the time, to adopt measures 
compatible with the existing agreements. The eventual text of Regulation 1026/2012, most 
notably, is not limited to compatibility with existing agreements but with international law, in 
general. With respect to the EU’s complaints, the Legal Service stated that “very specific 
investigation” would be required to show breaches of obligations. In particular, the 
“assessment of cooperation failures would require analysis of the legal context, the specific 
cooperation obligations at stake, the relevant circumstances and the behaviour of states 
allegedly breaching their obligations”.
368
 The Legal Service cited these aspects as important 
for the EU to be considered ‘injured’, which is a condition for a lawful countermeasure.  
 
Having this opinion in mind, the eventual text of Regulation 1026/2012 has not made it clear 
whether it is to be used only for situations where the particular third State has breached its 
obligations or also where the third State only harmed the EU’s fishing interests, albeit through 
legal conduct. The second recital of Regulation 1026/2012 speaks of failing to cooperate, 
which does not necessarily mean breaching the duty to cooperate as the Legal Service 
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indicated and as it was already explained in section III. Negotiations and, by the same token, 
cooperation may be unsuccessful in the sense that they do not result in an agreement. 
However, due to the conduct-oriented nature of the duties, even if the duties were complied 
with, lack of agreement may result. An addition is made in Article 3(a) of Regulation 
1026/2012, which sets out one of the criteria for identifying a State as allowing non-
sustainable fishing. It refers to failure to cooperate “in full compliance with the provisions of 
the UNCLOS and the UNFSA, or any other international agreement or norm of international 
law” (Emphasis added). 
 
This provision seems to suggest that measures can only be adopted against third States that 
are, in the view of the EU, in breach of their cooperation obligations but this is not completely 
clear. If this is so, with Regulation 1026/2012, the EU puts the imperative on reaching an 
agreement. In practice, this shifts the nature of the duties from conduct-oriented to result-
oriented. Doing this distorts a distinction that was held to be “of fundamental importance in 
determining how the breach of an international obligation is committed in any particular 
instance”.
369
 Naturally, the Faroe Islands objected to it. Accordingly, one needs to examine 
the measures of every implementing regulation to determine what kind of self-help measure 
the EU is employing and whether it is in compliance with international law.  
 
Looking at the recitals of Regulation 793/2013, it seems that, in the opinion of the EU, the 
adopted measures are not countermeasures but retaliations. Recital twenty-seven statedsthat  
 
“the Commission examined the compatibility of the measures with 
international law and concluded that they relate to the conservation of 
an exhaustable (sic) fish stock and aim at the avoidance of over-
exploitation of the stock made effective, since the measures aim to 
maintain the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock within safe biological 
limits”.  
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The Regulation continues to say that together with these measures the EU has also reduced its 
catches by 26%, implying compatibility with WTO law.
370
 This retaliation, in the view of the 
EU, was against illegal activities by the Faroe Islands. This appears from recital ten where it 
is stated that the Faroe Islands, with its herring-related activities, has “failed to cooperate with 
the Union […] and [has] failed to comply with the obligations under” several UNCLOS and 
UNFSA cooperation provisions as well as with the good faith obligation in Article 300 
UNCLOS. To what extent this was so remains arguable, due to the termination of the 
international proceedings in the Mackerel dispute. 
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In today’s world of increasing attention given to the environment and consequences of the 
climate change, even by the Pope,
371
 one phenomenon seems to have undeservedly fallen off 
the radar of the masses: the CMR of shared stocks. Under its seemingly technical veil there 
are very dynamic and curious processes occurring with enormous implications. With the 
decreasing number of fish in the sea, societies relying on fish for food and for their economic 
prosperity become increasingly sensitive to any disruptions in their fishing activities, and 
understandably so.  
 
CMRs can range from barely noticeable to tremendous changes in stock abundance. As the 
three common threads that were identified in this thesis show, CMRs may involve a change in 
the nature of the stock, a change in the States involved in the fishery (or their status), or a 
change in the zonal attachment of the stock. These changes have huge impact on the legal 
rights and obligations of the States affected by a CMR. Changing the nature of the stock 
changes the whole set of applicable legal provisions. The involvement of a new State, through 
the entering of the stock in that State’s EEZ, can lead to major reshuffling in the fishing 
interests and hence in the stakeholders in the fishery. Changes in the zonal attachment of 
shared stocks can raise serious equity concerns. These are just some examples of the said 
impact.  
 
These changes are, thus, representing compelling reasons for States to address CMRs when 
and where they occur. Addressing a CMR is not explicitly regulated in the existing regime but 
its provisions and the very nature of the regime easily allow for this to happen and the answer 
is simple – cooperation. The existing regime is not a snapshot of the realities when it was 
adopted or when it entered into force. Quite the contrary, it contains numerous references to 
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situations of changing circumstances and the UNCLOS has, thus, fittingly been called a living 
instrument. This living nature resonates in many fisheries provisions, requiring continuous 
action from States in ensuring the conservation and management of the fish stocks in the 
world ocean. Be that as it may, the analysis in this thesis showed that the existing regime 
provides States with some discretion to choose whether or not to actually address a CMR. 
There are two perspectives that were discerned from the regime – the voluntarist and the 
conservationist perspectives.  
 
The voluntarist perspective allows States to ignore a CMR and continue with the conservation 
and management plans they have already set up for the particular stock. This freedom is 
provided only where all relevant State agree with this course of action. However, once one of 
the relevant States requests renegotiation, the others must not ignore this call and must seek to 
agree in good faith on new measures. The Mackerel dispute supports the conclusion that there 
must be a renegotiation as a matter of law in such cases and also shows that CMR disputes 
will tend to concern factual disagreements. The existing regime was found to be well-
equipped for resolving such disputes with the Annex VIII UNCLOS fact-finding proceedings.  
 
The conservationist perspective does not, however, provide such freedom and does require 
action where conservationist concerns are present. This perspective is based on the multitude 
of provisions in the existing regime demanding action from States where the viability of 
stocks is threatened and sometimes even before that, in line with the precautionary approach. 
The regime also requires that effects on associated species are taken into account and the 
UNFSA strengthens this with its reference to the ecosystem approach. In such situations 
States are obliged to adopt measures alone or together, depending on the case at hand. In the 
case of transboundary and straddling stocks, however, very little can be achieved acting 
unilaterally. Thus, cooperation is once again the answer with negotiations as its first step. 
 
The strong emphasis on cooperation and negotiation under both perspectives, however, lacks 
a much needed safety net – provisions regulating the consequences of unsuccessful 
cooperation. The analysis showed that CMRs can, in certain circumstances, be a reason for 
the termination of international agreements and that the wide jurisdictional limitations in the 
dispute settlement provisions can lead States to act unilaterally and adopt self-help measures 
instead of cooperating further. These two factors can be detrimental to legal certainty. Hence, 
the lack of the safety net is seen as a major shortcoming of the existing regime for CMR cases. 




The review of the preparatory works showed that a conscious choice was made to exclude any 
provisions regulating the consequences of unsuccessful cooperation in order to strengthen the 
newly-acquired sovereign rights in the EEZ and ensure the freedom of the high seas. While 
these goals were achieved, another goal of the whole regime was somewhat undermined – the 
peaceful use of the oceans. Without that safety net, as the Mackerel dispute showed, a CMR 
may lead to bitter disagreements involving trade measures with serious economic implications 
even in the Western world. In other parts of the world, such disagreements may have even 
graver consequences – something that should not be discarded lightly. 
 
The trade measures in the Mackerel dispute were prompted by the lack of any instruments to 
effectively resolve situations of unsuccessful cooperation and, allegedly, had nothing but the 
sustainability of the herring in mind. Taking the enforcement of the existing regime into one’s 
own hands, however, can be a very dangerous initiative, irrespective of the intentions. The 
Faroe Islands started international proceedings asking for legal scrutiny of this action but they 
were all terminated. The legality of such autonomous acts must, nevertheless, be given an 
authoritative consideration. Although this is not possible now at the WTO, the existing regime 
provides the tool of Advisory Opinions by the ITLOS.
372
 It is a tool that can shed some light 
on the matter of cooperation, especially since the ITLOS unequivocally asserted its advisory 
jurisdiction earlier this year in another fisheries case. 
 
With the discussion of the duty to cooperate this thesis meant to further the legal debate on the 
consequences of CMRs for the international fisheries conservation regime by giving it a 
separate stand. While the thesis was narrowed down to only transboundary and straddling 
stocks (among other scope limitations), its analysis may be borrowed for evaluating the 
consequences for other types of stocks as well. One thing that becomes clear from the 
discussion is that States must cooperate more and early-on as well as avoid the use of coercive 
measures as their legality and productiveness is far from settled. When a State asks for the 
renegotiation of conservation and management measures due to a CMR, the request must be 
taken seriously and its merits reviewed even by a third party, if needed. The ocean realities in 
CMR cases require more expert assessments than political spats so that it is the news of 
collapsing and collapsed stocks that becomes a reminiscence of the past instead of Grotius’s 
view of fish as an inexhaustible resource. 
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